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Abstract
We examine the global operations of multi-product firms. We present a flexible heterogeneous-
firm trade model with either limited or strong scope for quality differentiation. Using customs
data for China during 2002-2006, we empirically establish that firms allocate activity across
products in line with a product hierarchy based on quality. Firms vary output quality across
their products by using inputs of different quality levels. Their core competence is in vari-
eties of superior quality that command higher prices but nevertheless generate higher sales.
In markets where they offer fewer products, firms concentrate on their core varieties by
dropping low-quality peripheral goods on the extensive margin and by shifting sales towards
top-quality products on the intensive margin. The product quality ladder also governs firms’
export dynamics, both in general and in response to the exogenous removal of MFA quotas
on textiles and apparel. Our results inform the drivers and measurement of firm performance,
the effects of trade reforms, and the design of development policies.
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1 Introduction
How firms organize production and sales across multiple product lines has important micro and
macro implications. At the micro level, bigger and more productive firms sell more products,
with the majority of their sales, exports and profits coming from a few core products (e.g.
Bernard et al 2009, Arkolakis-Muendler 2010). Moreover, reallocations across products improve
firm productivity and performance in response to shocks such as trade reforms or exchange
rate movements (e.g. Bernard et al 2010, 2011, Gopinath-Neiman 2014, Chatterjee et al 2013).
At the macro level, multi-product firms capture an overwhelming and disproportionately large
share of production, trade, and employment. Reallocations across heterogeneous firms shape
aggregate productivity, the welfare gains from trade, and the aggregate impact of idiosyncratic
and systemic shocks, especially with granularities in the firm size distribution (e.g. Arkolakis et al
2012, Melitz-Redding 2015, Pavcnik 2002, Gabaix 2011, di Giovanni et al 2014, Gaubert-Itskhoki
2016). Yet despite its implications for firm performance, aggregate welfare and inequality, the
allocation of activity across products within multi-product firms remains poorly understood.
Prima facie evidence for China suggests that product quality differentiation may be important
(Appendix Table 1). Firms that export products at higher average prices and firms that vary
prices more across their product range attain higher exports. Controlling for initial trade activity,
such firms also achieve faster export growth. Although output prices may not directly reflect
product quality, similar patterns hold when output quality is inferred from data on export prices
and quantities, or proxied with the price or inferred quality of imported inputs. In addition, firms
with higher productivity, employment, skill-, capital-, advertising and R&D intensity have higher
average prices and quality, as well as greater price and quality dispersion across products.1 These
findings indicate that quality differentiation across firms and across products within firms may
be key to understanding firms’ export performance and the differential effects of trade reforms
across the firm size and worker skill distribution.
This paper examines the global operations of multi-product firms in light of the motivating
facts. We present a flexible heterogeneous-firm trade model that characterizes the behavior of
multi-product firms with either limited or strong scope for quality differentiation. Using rich cus-
toms data for China during 2002-2006, we empirically establish that firms allocate activity across
products in line with strong quality differentiation. They observe a product hierarchy governed
by quality which determines how they participate in different markets and how they respond to
changes in economic conditions over time. First, multi-product firms vary output quality across
their product range by using inputs of different quality levels. Second, firms’ core competence
is in varieties of superior quality that command higher prices but nevertheless generate higher
sales than cheaper goods of lower quality. Third, in markets where they offer fewer products,
1Inferring unobserved product quality is an important methodological contribution of our analysis that we
discuss below. We calculate the average and the standard deviation of observed prices and inferred quality across
products after first demeaning by product fixed effects. We describe the data sample, variable definition, and
empirical specifications behind these conditional correlations in the notes to Appendix Table 1.
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firms concentrate activity in their core varieties by dropping low-quality peripheral goods on the
extensive margin and by shifting sales towards top-quality products on the intensive margin.
Finally, the systematic reallocation of activity across the product quality ladder guides firms’
export dynamics, both in general and in response to the exogenous removal of MFA quotas on
textiles and apparel.
Our theoretical framework illustrates how the possibility for vertical differentiation affects the
production and sales decisions of multi-product firms, relative to a world with only horizontal
differentiation. We refer to these economic environments as quality sorting and efficiency sorting,
respectively. In the model, firm-level ability and firm-product-specific expertise draws create
exogenous variation in production efficiency across firms and across products within firms. Under
quality sorting, firms can choose to make products of higher quality at a higher marginal cost
by assembling more expensive inputs of higher quality. The exogenous variation in production
efficiency induces endogenous variation in quality across firms and products, as well as in product
scope and sales profile across firms. Abler companies offer higher quality of any given good,
sell more goods, enter more markets, and earn higher revenues. Within a firm, more expensive
varieties of higher quality generate higher bilateral and worldwide sales. Firms vary their product
scope across heterogeneous country markets, and expand their product range by progressively
adding goods in decreasing order of price and quality. Under efficiency sorting by contrast, there
is no quality differentiation in the market place, and higher productivity is associated with lower
marginal costs, lower prices, and higher sales. Firms now follow product hierarchies based on
production efficiency, and all predictions for input and output prices are reversed.
Guided by this conceptual framework, we analyze the operations of multi-product firms using
firm-level data for China on the universe of export and import transactions during 2002-2006. An
important advantage of these data is that we observe the price and sales for all of a firm’s exports
by destination and product, as well as the price of all of its imported intermediate inputs. On the
sales side, this allows us to examine the relationship between product scope and the distribution
of product prices and sales across the different markets in which the same firm operates. On the
production side, we are able to implement a new methodology we develop for matching multiple
inputs (and their prices) to multiple output products (and their prices).
We perform four empirical exercises, and conclude that multi-product firms organize oper-
ations in a manner consistent with quality sorting but not with efficiency sorting. First, we
establish evidence for the most distinctive prediction of quality sorting: the price-sales profile
of multi-product firms. We show that export prices are positively correlated with worldwide
exports across products within a firm-year and with bilateral sales across products within firm-
destination-years. Model-consistent estimates of product quality are likewise positively associated
with export revenues across a firms’ product range, where we infer unobserved quality from ob-
served price and quantity data as in Khandelwal (2008). These results do not appear to be
driven by variable mark-ups: They are robust to controlling for firms’ market power with their
share of the relevant (country-)product market. They are also stronger for differentiated goods
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and for advertising- and R&D intensive industries with greater scope for quality upgrading.2
Second, we provide empirical support for the idea that firms use inputs of varying quality in
order to manufacture products of varying quality. We document that input prices are positively
correlated with output prices across products within a firm-year, even when we account for firms’
market share in input and output markets. In the absence of detailed information on domestic
inputs or direct measures of product quality, we use the prices that producers pay for imported
intermediates to proxy the quality of their inputs.3 We exploit detailed input-output tables for
China to allocate firms’ multiple imported inputs to the production of their multiple outputs,
and we thereby obtain an input price index for each output product. Our results are stable
across several variants of this assignment technique.
Third, we demonstrate that firms’ product scope and allocation of activity across products
are directly linked through a product hierarchy characterized by quality.4 We rank the products
of each firm based on their global sales, price, or inferred quality. Looking across the different
markets that an exporter serves, we find that firms systematically shift activity towards their
core top-ranked varieties in markets where they offer fewer products. On the extensive margin,
they drop cheaper, lower-quality goods that place lower in their product ladder. On the intensive
margin, they skew sales towards their best-selling, most expensive, highest-quality products.
Finally, we show that quality sorting governs multi-product firms’ response to changes in
economic conditions over time. We agnostically study the export dynamics of all firms surviving
from the beginning to the end of our panel, without taking a stance on why they choose to
adjust trade activity. We also examine how surviving exporters in the textiles and apparel
industry respond to a specific exogenous trade shock, namely the removal of export quotas
under the Multi-Fiber Agreement in 2005. Both exercises reveal that firms expand (contract)
their product scope and global exports by adding (dropping) lower-ranked varieties along the
quality ladder and by reducing (increasing) the concentration of sales in top-ranked products.
We contribute to the international trade literatures on multi-product firms and on firm het-
erogeneity in efficiency and quality (e.g. Bernard et al 2010, 2011, Melitz et al 2014, Eckel-Neary
2010, Verhoogen 2008, Kugler-Verhoogen 2012, Hallak-Sivadasan 2013, Iacovone-Javorcik 2012,
Manova-Zhang 2012). We build on insights from both literatures, and emphasize how their
interaction enriches our understanding of multi-product firms. Theoretically, we highlight the
role of quality sorting by presenting a general conceptual framework with minimal assumptions
about consumer preferences and market structure. Methodologically, we propose novel strategies
2Variable mark-ups are unlikely to drive our results on theoretical grounds either, because the correlation
between prices and revenues remains positive (negative) under quality (efficiency) sorting under various demand
and market structures. See Section 2.2.1 for more details.
3This is consistent with evidence in Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) of a positive correlation between the prices
that Colombian plants pay for their imported and domestic inputs.
4Differential demand shocks across products and markets can induce firms to deviate from perfectly observing
a fixed product hierarchy. Several checks we perform in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.4 suggest that such deviations are
indeed present. See Eaton et al (2011), Armenter-Koren (2014), and Head et al (2014) for related work on the
stability of destination and product hierarchies across firms and cities.
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for proxying product quality and for mapping multiple inputs to multiple outputs within firms.
Empirically, we corroborate and extend concurrent evidence in Eckel et al (2015) that Mexican
firms earn higher domestic and global revenues from their more expensive varieties.
We also shed light on the economic impact of globalization. Reallocations across firms and
within-firm productivity upgrading mediate welfare gains from trade, with reallocations across
products key to the latter (e.g. Melitz-Redding 2013, Burstein-Melitz 2013, Bustos 2011, Bernard
et al 2011, Mayer et al 2016). However, financial and labor market frictions distort the pattern
of trade activity within and across firms and their response to trade reforms (e.g. Manova 2013,
Helpman et al 2010, Cosar et al 2016). Separately, more successful exporters hire more skilled
workers and pay higher wages, while sophisticated inputs and skilled labor are complementary in
the production of output quality (e.g. Verhoogen 2008, Bernard et al 2012). In light of this, our
findings suggest that quality-driven reallocations across products within firms are important in
understanding how trade liberalization impacts firm performance and aggregate welfare, as well
as inequality through differential adjustments along the firm size and worker skill distribution.
More broadly, we speak to fundamental questions in industrial organization about firms’
production and sales decisions. Standard balance-sheet data make it difficult to study these
questions because they report total firm revenues and input purchases, with no price series or
break-down by product and market. By exploiting customs records on the universe of firms’
export and import transactions, we add three insights to IO evidence based on case studies of
specific industries and markets. First, our findings for the relationship between product scope
and sales distribution across products are inconsistent with constant mark-ups featured in models
with CES preferences and monopolistic competition. Instead, they point to variable mark-ups
that emerge for example in models with CES preferences and linear demand or in models with
cross-product synergies or cannibalization (e.g. Melitz et al 2014, Eckel-Neary 2010, Dhingra
2013). Second, the variation in marginal costs, quality, mark-ups and prices across firms and
across products within firms complicates the measurement of firm productivity and mark-ups,
and validates recent work that aims to address it (e.g. de Loecker-Warzynski 2012, de Loecker et
al 2016). Third, this implies that micro and macro analyses that rely on price data need to take
quality and mark-up variation into account. For instance, this applies to studies of exchange
rate pass-through to producer and consumer prices (e.g. Gopinath et al 2011) and to the design
and implementation of anti-dumping and competition policies.
Lastly, we inform policy-relevant questions about export promotion in developing countries as
a means to economic growth. While policy debates often center on improving cost competitive-
ness, our analysis indicates that quality upgrading is key to firms’ export success. This suggests
that policy makers may want to encourage investment not only in production efficiency, but also
in quality capabilities. Recent evidence on the effects of import liberalization is consistent with
the role we document for imported intermediates in producing high-quality products: Access to
a wider range of foreign inputs and to foreign inputs of superior quality than those domestically
available enables firms to expand product scope, productivity and quality (e.g. Amiti-Konings
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2007, Gopinath-Neiman 2014, Halpern et al 2015, de Loecker et al 2016, Goldberg et al 2010,
Fan et al 2015, Bas-StraussKahn 2015). Equally important is access to skilled labor and effective
management practices (e.g. Verhoogen 2008, Bloom et al 2016).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 develop the model and
its testable predictions. Sections 4 and 5 introduce the data and present the empirical results.
The last section concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
How do multi-product firms organize their global production and sales activities when there is
potential for both horizontal and vertical differentiation in the market space? In this section,
we characterize multi-product firms’ behavior when they simultaneously compete on production
efficiency and product quality. We focus on three decisions that firms make in order to maximize
profits: the optimal range of products and markets, the optimal quality of each product, and the
optimal distribution of quality, prices, and sales across products and markets. We identify the
key economic mechanisms that govern these decisions, and derive empirically testable predictions
that allow us to validate them in the data. We emphasize that both the presence and the
scope for quality differentiation critically affect observable firm outcomes. While the nature of
consumer demand and firm competition matter, they do not qualitatively impact the role of
quality differentiation.
We examine multi-product, multi-quality firms in a stylized conceptual framework with min-
imal assumptions about the underlying demand, production and market structure. This flexible
specification illustrates the generality of our theoretical predictions in a transparent manner. We
show in an Online Appendix how our main propositions can be formally derived from closed-form
solutions under concrete assumptions about consumer preferences (CES and linear demand), pro-
duction technology (quantity and quality production functions with fixed and variable costs), and
market structure (monopolistic competition).5 Our theoretical results, and the interpretation of
our empirical findings in their light, would thus be valid both in more general settings than we
consider here and in fully specified frameworks such as those in the Online Appendix.
2.1 Production efficiency and product quality
Consider a world with J + 1 countries in which heterogeneous firms can produce multiple hor-
izontally and vertically differentiated goods.6 Let consumers’ utility in country j be increasing
5In the Online Appendix, we incorporate efficiency and quality variation across firms and across products within
firms into two existing models of multi-product firms: Bernard-Redding-Schott (2010) and Melitz-Mayer-Ottaviano
(2014). In the former case we follow closely the analysis in Bloom et al (2016).
6Our theoretical propositions hold whether firms manufacture a granular set or a continuum of products. We
consider the former in this section for expositional purposes and in the interest of a transparent mapping between
theory and empirics; the Online Appendix illustrates the robustness of our predictions to the latter scenario.
Measurement error resulting from the aggregation of unobserved varieties at the barcode level to observed product
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in product variety, product quantity and product quality, such that demand xji for variety i
is increasing in its quality qi, decreasing in its price pji, and increasing in aggregate demand
Rj and a quality-adjusted aggregate price index Pj , xji
(
pji
−
, qi,
+
Rj
+
, Pj
+
)
. We define quality as
any intrinsic characteristic or taste preference that improves the consumer appeal of a product
given its price. This implies that observed output prices will reflect the combined effect of both
objective and subjective dimensions of product quality, while observed input prices will capture
only the former. Our empirical analysis will encompass both interpretations as we will examine
evidence on both output and input prices.
In order to begin production, firms have to incur sunk entry costs associated with research
and product development. Firms face ex-ante uncertainty about their production efficiency, and
discover it only after completing this irreversible investment. The success of R&D will generally
differ across potential product lines within a firm. A firm’s production efficiency in variety i
can therefore be thought of as the product ϕλi of a firm-wide ability draw ϕ and a firm-product
specific expertise draw λi, assumed independent of each other.
Two factors determine firms’ marginal production cost ci: their capacity ϕλi to assemble
given inputs efficiently and the marginal cost of their inputs wi, where ci =
wi
ϕλi
. In the absence
of quality differentiation across inputs, all producers would face the same input cost. This will
no longer be the case in the presence of quality differentiation, as firms can endogenously choose
to use different inputs.
When there is scope for vertical differentiation, we assume that the technology for quality
production exhibits two properties. First, manufacturing goods of higher quality is associated
with higher marginal input costs because it requires the use of high-quality intermediate inputs,
specialized equipment, and skilled workers.7 Second, there is complementarity between produc-
tion efficiency and input quality. Such complementarity could be attributed, for example, to
the heightened importance of minimizing production errors and ensuring quality control when
processing more sophisticated intermediates. These minimal assumptions will be sufficient to
generate rich predictions. They are moreover consistent with prior evidence of positive correla-
tions among product quality, output prices, input prices, wages, and management competence
across firms within narrow industries (Verhoogen 2008, Kugler-Verhoogen 2012, Manova-Zhang
2012, Crozet et al 2009, Iacovone-Javorcik 2010, Bloom et al 2016).
Finally, firms face fixed operation costs of headquarter services f and fixed management
costs fp for each active product line. This will imply that companies with different ability
draws will choose to produce a different number of products. Entering each foreign market j
necessitates additional headquarter services fj associated with customs, regulatory compliance,
and the maintenance of distribution networks. As a result, some low-ability domestic sellers
will not become exporters or will supply some but not all countries. Finally, exporting entails
categories can bridge theoretical predictions for product continua to empirical patterns for product granularity.
7In turn, higher-quality intermediate inputs and more specialized equipment are presumably more expensive
because they are produced by more skilled workers that earn a higher wage.
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additional destination-product specific fixed costs fjp, which reflect market research, advertising,
product customization and standardization. There are also iceberg transportation costs such that
τ j units of a good need to be shipped for 1 unit to arrive. Trade costs are bilateral but we have
suppressed the subscripts indicating the exporting country for simplicity. Because of these trade
costs, firms will not offer every product they sell at home in every foreign market they enter.
2.2 Firm behavior
2.2.1 Quality and price setting
Upon entry, firms observe their full vector of draws {ϕ;λi, i ∈ Ωi}, and decide whether to exit
immediately or to commence production. If they begin operations, they determine which prod-
ucts i to manufacture, which country markets j to serve, and which products to offer in each
market. To build intuition, we consider a static world in which firms produce a single quality
version of each product in their portfolio and there are no supply or demand interdependencies
across destination-products within firms. This allows us to illustrate the key mechanisms at play
in a tractable environment that reduces the firms’ profit maximization problem to a series of
separable decisions.
A manufacturer will maximize total profits by separatetely maximizing the global profits that
it could potentially generate from each product. In particular, a firm with ability ϕ and product
expertise λi will simultaneously choose the optimal input cost wi and thereby output quality qi;
whether to enter market j (i.e. Zji = 1) or not (i.e. Zji = 0); and the optimal price pji and
quantity xji to offer in country j. This maximization problem can be represented as follows:
max
{wi,Zji,pji,xji}
pii (ϕ, λi) =
∑
j
piji (ϕ, λi) = (1)
=
∑
j
Zji [pji (ϕ, λi, wi)xji (ϕ, λi, wi)− Cji (ci, xji, fpj , τ j)]
s.t. xji = xji (pji, qi, Rj , Pj) , ci =
wi
ϕλi
and qi = qi (ϕ, λi, wi) .
Firms are atomistic and take aggregate demand Rj and price indices Pj as given. The total
cost of manufacturing and delivering quantity xji to market j is denoted Cji
(
ci
+
, xji
+
, fpj
+
, τ j
+
)
. It
is assumed to increase with marginal costs ci, quantity xji, fixed and variable production and
distribution costs fpj and τ j . In the case of domestic sales, Zdi = 1, τd = 1, and fixed costs
correspond to the product-specific overhead costs fp. Recall that ceteris paribus, demand xji is
increasing in quality qi and decreasing in price pji. Moreover, quality is increasing and super-
modular in input costs wi and production efficiency ϕλi, while marginal costs ci are increasing
in input costs and decreasing in production efficiency. Although general, these properties allow
us to characterize key aspects of firm behavior in equilibrium.
In this environment, the technological complementarity between firm capability and input
quality in the production of output quality implies that firms with exogenously higher production
efficiency ϕλi will endogenously choose to use more expensive, higher-quality inputs and thereby
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assemble higher-quality products, such that wi
(
ϕλi
+
)
and qi
(
ϕλi
+
, wi
+
)
in the spirit of Kugler-
Verhoogen (2012).8 This will generate quality differences across firms competing in the same
product category, and induce each firm to vary input and output quality across its product range
in response to the exogenous variation in its expertise λi across products.
To fix ideas, it is conveninent to express the endogenous input costs as a function of the
exogenous production efficiency wi (ϕ, λi) = (ϕλi)
θ+1, θ ≥ −1, whereby marginal costs become
ci (ϕ, λi) = (ϕλi)
θ. This formulation permits a transparent examination of the implications of
quality differentiation for various firm outcomes. It is without loss of generality as any monotonic
transformation of these functions would preserve our qualitative results. The parameter θ governs
the sensitivity of production costs and implicitly of output quality with respect to input quality
and production capacity. It can be thought of as the scope for quality differentiation from the
consumer’s perspective or the return to quality differentiation from the producer’s perspective.
Consider the variation across firms manufacturing the same product category. Exogenously
more efficient firms will have endogenously (weakly) lower marginal costs if either (i) products
are not vertically differentiated (i.e. θ = −1) or (ii) products are vertically differentiated and
more efficient firms use higher-quality inputs, but marginal costs do not increase sufficiently
quickly with quality (i.e. −1 < θ ≤ 0). Conversely, exogenously more efficient firms will have
endogenously higher marginal costs if (iii) products are vertically differentiated, more efficient
firms use higher-quality inputs, and marginal costs rise sufficiently quickly with quality (i.e.
θ > 0). This also applies to the variation in production efficiency and marginal costs across
products within firms.
Adopting the nomenclature in the prior literature, we will describe scenarios (i) and (ii) as
efficiency sorting and scenario (iii) as quality sorting. Note that while quality sorting implies
the presence of quality differentiation, efficiency sorting does not confirm its absence.
In any given market j, firms will charge a price equal to their marginal cost plus an optimal
mark-up that generally depends on the nature of consumer demand and market competition. In
the absence of dynamic strategic interaction among firms, a seller has no incentive to underprice
a competitor with lower marginal costs. In a wide class of standard models, the equilibrium
ranking of prices across firm-products will therefore inherit the underlying ranking of marginal
costs despite the possibility of variable mark-ups, pji
(
ci
+
, τ j
+
)
.
We illustrate this point with three concrete examples. Under CES demand and monopolistic
competition as in Melitz (2003), all firms extract the same constant mark-up above marginal
cost, determined by the demand elasticity of substitution across varieties. Deviating from either
assumption about the market structure creates incentives for variable mark-ups. Under CES
8Kugler-Verhoogen (2012) and Johnson (2012) show that economies of scale in quality production would gener-
ate similar predictions. Manufacturing a higher-quality product might entail higher fixed costs if it requires more
complex assembly processes, more expensive equipment, stricter quality control or more managerial oversight.
More productive firms that expect to capture a bigger market share by charging lower quality-adjusted prices
would then be incentivized to produce higher-quality goods.
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demand and Bertrand competition as in Bernard et al (2003), the most efficient supplier of a
good captures the entire market by pricing either at the monopolistically competitive level or
at the marginal cost of the second most efficient potential supplier, whichever is lower. Under
linear demand and monopolistic competition as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008), firms’ optimal mark-
up depends on their marginal cost relative to a choke price at which demand falls to zero, which
is governed by demand elasticities and the overall competitiveness in a market.
In all three set-ups, firm-products with exogenously higher production efficiency will sell at
lower prices under efficiency sorting and at higher prices under quality sorting. In other words,
pji
(
ϕλi
−
)
if θ ≤ 0 and pji
(
ϕλi
+
)
if θ > 0. With constant mark-ups, this directly reflects the
variation in marginal costs across firms and products. With variable mark-ups, abler producers
extract higher mark-ups than less able competitors selling varieties of the same product. Across
products within a firm, core goods with higher expertise receive higher mark-ups than peripheral
goods with lower expertise. In the case of quality sorting, a firm’s higher-quality products thus
sell at higher prices both because they entail higher marginal costs and because they secure
bigger mark-ups. In the case of efficiency sorting, a firm’s more efficiently produced goods sell
at lower prices despite receiving higher mark-ups because of their lower marginal costs.9
This framework demonstrates how quality differentiation importantly affects the relationship
between prices, revenues and profits across active firms and products in a given market j. Since
consumer demand decreases with quality-adjusted prices, varieties associated with higher pro-
duction efficiency will always generate higher sales revenues and profits, such that rji
(
ϕλi
+
)
and piji
(
ϕλi
+
)
regardless of the scope for quality differentiation. Under efficiency sorting (i.e.
θ ≤ 0), firm-products with lower marginal costs ϕλi thus command lower prices and earn higher
revenues and profits as in Bernard et al (2010) and Melitz et al (2014). By contrast, these
patterns are reversed under quality sorting (i.e. θ > 0): Within a given product category, more
successful firms now enjoy bigger revenues and profits despite charging higher prices because
they offer products of superior quality. Across products within a firm, more expensive varieties
are of better quality and bring higher revenues and profits.
We have abstracted away from the possibility for cross-product interdependencies in produc-
tion or consumption in order to emphasize the distinction between efficiency and quality sorting.
While cross-product synergies or cannibalization could affect firms’ product scope, pricing strat-
egy and sales profile, they would not reorder products in firms’ product hierarchy in terms of
production efficiency or product quality. As a result, they would not qualitatively change the
9Allowing for dynamic strategic pricing behavior might nuance these theoretical predictons, but it would not
affect the interpretation of our empirical results. If firms strategically lower or raise all mark-ups across their
product range, our results for the variation across products within firms would still hold. If firms strategically
increase the spread of mark-ups between core and peripheral goods, this would amplify forces that we already
account for. Finally, if firms strategically decrease the spread of mark-ups between core and peripheral goods,
the predicted correlation between prices and revenues across products within firms would be less positive or more
negative. This would work against us finding evidence for quality differentiation as we do.
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key predictions for firm behavior in Propositions 1-4 that we take to the data.10
2.2.2 Activity across multiple products
The variation in exogenous production efficiency and endogenous product quality across firms
and products gives rise to systematic patterns in firms’ market entry decisions Zji. A key feature
of this extensive margin is the observance of a product hierarchy from core to peripheral goods
that is governed by the scope for quality differentiation.
Consumer love of variety and the presence of product-specific overhead costs fp imply that
no firm will export a product without also selling it at home. Firms will therefore manufacture
only goods for which they can earn non-negative profits domestically. Since profits increase in
production efficiency ϕλi, there is a zero-profit expertise cut-off λ
∗ (ϕ) for each ability level ϕ,
below which firm ϕ will not make product i. This cut-off is defined by pidi (ϕ, λ
∗ (ϕ)) = 0. Since
ϕ and λi are independent draws, higher-ability firms will have a lower threshold λ
∗
(
ϕ
−
)
and
offer more products.
Turning to trade, firms will only enter a given destination-product market if they expect to
earn positive profits there. Given that piji
(
ϕλi
+
)
, a firm with ability ϕ will export product i
to country j if its expertise draw λi is no lower than a zero-profit cut-off λ
∗
j (ϕ) determined by
piji
(
ϕ, λ∗j (ϕ)
)
= 0. Following the same logic as before, λ∗j
(
ϕ
−
)
and abler firms will sell a bigger
number of products nj
(
ϕ
+
)
than less able firms to any given destination. Prior evidence indicates
that there is selection into exporting such that firms sell only a subset of their domestically-
marketed products to country j. Similarly, only a subset of domestically active firms in a given
product category export abroad. This is consistent with λ∗j (ϕ) > λ
∗ (ϕ) for all j.
Firms will generally adjust their product range across destinations because λ∗j (ϕ) depends
on market-specific aggregate demand Rj , price index Pj , variable τ j and fixed fpj trade costs.
However, sellers will observe a strict hierarchy of products that is stable across destinations. In
each market it enters, exporter ϕ will start with the same core variety and add more goods in
decreasing order of expertise λi until it reaches the marginal product that brings zero profits.
11
10Cross-product synergies or cannibalization effects would generate respectively centrifugal or centripetal forces
in firms’ product portfolio. For example, Eckel-Neary (2010) study cross-product cannibalization in consumption
that arises because an increase in the sales of one variety in a firm’s portfolio reduces demand for its other
varieties. On the production side, there may be synergies in fixed costs such as equipment or managerial supervision
across product lines, or, conversely, diseconomies of scope due to capacity constraints or span of control issues in
managerial supervision.
Intuitively, centrifugal (centripetal) forces would lead firms to offer more (fewer) products than in our baseline.
They may also introduce additional motives for variable mark-ups. If so, any centrifugal (centripetal) force that
incentivizes firms to widen (narrow) their product scope would also induce them to concentrate sales away from
(towards) their top varieties. Relative to peripheral goods, firms’ core products would still generate higher sales,
sell at lower (higher) prices under efficiency (quality) sorting, and receive weakly higher mark-ups.
11Product hierarchies will generally vary among producers because the expertise draws are i.i.d. across firms
and goods. In practice, the product ranking might also vary across countries within a manufacturer if there are
idiosyncractic taste or cost shocks at the firm-destination-product level. Such idiosyncracies would work against
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The nature of this product ladder is the main dimension along which the behavior of multi-
product firms changes when there is sufficient scope for vertical differentiation in production.
Under efficiency sorting (i.e. θ ≤ 0), firms’ core competences lie in their cheapest varieties.
Sellers therefore expand their product range by adding products in increasing order of marginal
cost and price. Under quality sorting by contrast (i.e. θ > 0), a firm’s best-selling variety is its
most expensive, highest-quality item. Producers now widen their product scope by adding goods
in decreasing order of marginal cost and price.
When firms adjust their product range across markets, they can modify not only their product
mix on the extensive margin, but also the sales distribution across inframarginal products. This
will however depend on the market structure. With CES demand and monopolistic competition,
for example, the ratio of a supplier’s expertise in two varieties uniquely determines the ratio of
their sales in a given market, regardless of the supplier’s product scope there. This is no longer
the case with variable mark-ups. Consider for instance linear demand with monopolistic compe-
tition or, alternatively, CES demand with Bertrand competition. In both cases, firms respond
to increased market competition by shifting activity towards their core competences along both
the extensive and the intensive margins: They sell fewer varieties by dropping peripheral prod-
ucts, and they also skew the sales distribution across their surviving products towards their top
varieties. In more general demand structures with variable mark-ups, any centripetal force that
incentivizes firms to narrow their product scope will intuitively also induce them to concentrate
sales towards their top varieties. This includes demand structures that allow for cross-product
interdependencies in production or consumption.
We summarize the solution to firms’ maximization problem at the product level in equation
(1) as follows: Within a multi-product firm, core goods will be sold to more markets, earn higher
revenues in each market, and generate higher worldwide sales than peripheral goods. Within the
firm’s product portfolio, core goods are always the ones produced with most expertise. However,
while they are the cheapest varieties in the absence of quality differentiation, they represent the
most expensive, highest-quality ones in its presence.
2.2.3 Activity across multiple markets
A firm with ability ϕ will enter destination market j if its expected profits there from all varieties
i with expertise λi > λ
∗
j (ϕ) exceed the fixed headquarters cost of exporting fhj , i.e. if pij (ϕ) =∑
i:λi>λ
∗
j (ϕ)
piji (ϕ, λi) − fhj ≥ 0. Export profits pij (ϕ) increase with ability because abler firms
sell more products to j and earn higher revenues from each product, compared to competitors
with the same expertise draws but lower ability. Thus only firms with ability above a cut-off
level ϕ∗j will service destination j, where ϕ
∗
j satisfies pij
(
ϕ∗j
)
= 0.
With asymmetric countries, ϕ∗j varies across destinations and abler firms enter more markets
because they are above the export threshold for more countries. Abler exporters thus outperform
us finding empirical support for our theoretical propositions.
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less able producers along all three export margins: number of export destinations, product range
in each destination, and sales in each destination-product market.
Finally, not all firms that incur the sunk cost of entry survive. Once they observe their ability
and expertise draws, firms begin production only if their expected profits from all domestic and
foreign operations are non-negative, i.e. pi (ϕ) =
∑
j pij (ϕ) − fh ≥ 0, where fh is the firm-level
fixed cost of headquarter services. Total profits increase in ϕ because abler firms manufacture
and sell more products domestically, earn higher domestic revenues for each product, and have
superior export performance as described above. Companies below a minimum ability level ϕ∗
are therefore unable to break even and exit immediately upon learning their attributes. This
cut-off is defined by the zero-profit condition pi (ϕ∗) = 0.
3 Empirical Predictions
Section 2 delivers a number of testable predictions that make it possible to empirically distin-
guish between models of multi-product firms with and without quality differentiation, as well as
between models with constant and with variable mark-ups. We now summarize these predictions.
3.1 Variation across firms within a product
Within a given product category, the correlation between price and revenue across firms depends
on the extent of quality differentiation. This is a central result in the prior literature and not
novel to our framework, but we restate it here for completeness.
Proposition 1 Across firms within a destination-product market, export prices and export rev-
enues are positively correlated under quality sorting (θ > 0), but negatively correlated under
efficiency sorting (θ ≤ 0).
3.2 Variation across products within a firm
In the absence of vertical differentiation across products, firms’ core products have low marginal
costs and prices. By contrast, when there is scope for quality upgrading, firms’ best-selling
varieties are associated with superior quality, higher marginal costs, and higher prices.
Proposition 2 Across products within a firm and across products within a firm-destination,
export prices and export revenues are positively correlated under quality sorting (θ > 0), but
negatively correlated under efficiency sorting (θ ≤ 0).
3.3 Variation across destinations within a firm
Product scope and product hierarchies
Multi-product firms observe a product hierarchy. Firms focus on their core competences
and drop their peripheral goods in destinations where they sell fewer products. With constant
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mark-ups, this has clear implications for a firm’s average price pj (ϕ) across the products it offers
in market j. Under quality sorting, exporters add varieties in decreasing order of marginal cost
and quality. Firm ϕ will thus offer lower average quality at a lower average price in countries
where it exports more products. Under efficiency sorting by contrast, product scope nj (ϕ) and
pj (ϕ) are instead positively correlated across destinations within firms, because exporters add
products in increasing order of marginal cost.
The relationship between firms’ product range and average price is more nuanced in envi-
ronments with variable mark-ups. It is still the case that firms offer more cheaper (expensive)
varieties when they expand their product scope under quality (efficiency) sorting. At the same
time, sellers might also charge higher mark-ups depending on the market structure. In the case
of linear demand and monopolistic competition, for example, firms export more products to mar-
kets where they face less competition and where they can therefore set higher mark-ups. Under
efficiency sorting, variable mark-ups can thus amplify the positive correlation between product
scope and pj (ϕ) across destinations within a firm. Under quality sorting, by contrast, variable
mark-ups can make this correlation less negative and possibly even positive.
Note that across markets within a firm, the correlation between the number of exported
products nj (ϕ) and the simple average product price pj (ϕ) is driven by the extensive margin
of product selection. The corresponding correlation between nj (ϕ) and the revenue-weighted
average product price p˜j (ϕ) reflects both product selection and the relative sales of different
products in the firm’s portfolio. Since core varieties generate higher sales, p˜j (ϕ) > pj (ϕ) under
quality sorting and p˜j (ϕ) < pj (ϕ) under efficiency sorting. This implies that the correlation
between nj (ϕ) and p˜j (ϕ) is smaller than the correlation between nj (ϕ) and pj (ϕ) in absolute
terms, and its precise sign is theoretically ambiguous.
Proposition 3 Firms observe a product hierarchy. They expand product scope by adding more
peripheral products of lower price under quality sorting (θ > 0), and by adding more peripheral
products of higher price under efficiency sorting (θ ≤ 0). Across destinations within a firm,
product scope and the simple average product price are positively correlated under efficiency
sorting; either negatively or positively correlated under quality sorting; and less correlated than
product scope and the revenue-weighted average product price.
Product scope and sales distribution
All else constant, firms earn higher revenues in destinations where they export more goods.
Depending on the market structure, the distribution of sales across products may or may not
change with the number of varieties sold. These relationships hold regardless of the presence
and scope for quality differentiation in production.
Proposition 4 Across destinations within a firm, export product scope and export revenues
are positively correlated. Across destinations within a firm, the distribution of revenues across
13
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
products is independent of product scope under constant mark-ups, but its skewness towards the
firm’s core products decreases with product scope under variable mark-ups.
4 Data
Our analysis exploits proprietary data from the Chinese Customs Office on the universe of
Chinese firms that participated in international trade over the 2002-2006 period.12 These data
report the free-on-board value of all export and import trnsactions in U.S. dollars by firm, product
and trade partner for 239 destination/source countries and 8,908 different products in the 8-digit
Harmonized System.13 They also record the quantities traded in one of 12 different units of
measurement (such as kilograms, square meters, etc.), which makes it possible to construct unit
values. Trade volumes for each HS-8 digit product category are consistently documented in a
unique unit of measurement.
In principle, unit values should precisely reflect producer prices. Since trade datasets rarely
contain direct information on prices, the prior literature has typically relied on unit values as we
do. The level of detail in our data is an important advantage as the unit prices we observe are
not polluted by aggregation across firms or across markets and products within firms. We have
confirmed that all of our results are robust to excluding potential outliers with price levels below
the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile.
While we observe all trade transactions at the monthly frequency, we work with annualized
exports for two reasons. First, there is a lot of seasonality and lumpiness in the monthly data,
and most companies do not sell the same product to a given market in every month. By focusing
on annual data, we avoid this issue and related concerns with sticky prices. Second, outliers are
likely to be of greater concern in the monthly data.
Some state-owned enterprises in China are pure export-import businesses that do not engage
in manufacturing but act exclusively as intermediaries between domestic producers (buyers)
and foreign buyers (suppliers). Following standard practice in the literature, we identify such
wholesalers using keywords in firms’ names and exclude them from our sample.14 We do so
in order to focus on the operations of companies that both make and trade goods since we are
interested in how production efficiency and product quality affect export activity. Showing direct
evidence on the prices firms pay for imported inputs is thus an important part of our analysis as
they proxy input quality. We cannot apply this approach to intermediaries because we do not
observe their suppliers and cannot interpret their import transactions as input purchases.
12Manova-Zhang (2008) describe these data and provide an overview of Chinese trade patterns. While the raw
data covers the 2000-2006 period, the HS 8-digit product classification changed in 2002. Given our interest in the
operations of multi-product firms, we focus on the 2002-2006 period for which products are consistently coded.
13Product classification is consistent across countries at the 6-digit HS level. The number of distinct product
codes in the Chinese 8-digit HS classification is comparable to that in the 10-digit HS trade data for the U.S.
14We drop 23,073 wholesalers who mediate a quarter of China’s trade. Using the same data, Ahn et al. (2011)
identify intermediaries in the same way in order to study wholesale activity.
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We study the variation in the scope for quality differentiation across products using three
relatively standard proxies in the literature. These measures are meant to capture technological
characteristics of the manufacturing process that are exogenous from the perspective of an indi-
vidual firm. The first indicator is the Rauch (1999) dummy for differentiated goods that are not
traded on an organized exchange or listed in reference manuals. It is available for SITC 4-digit
categories, which we concord to the Chinese HS 8-digit classification. We also employ continu-
ous measures of R&D intensity or combined advertising and R&D intensity from Klingebiel et
al (2007) and Kugler-Verhoogen (2008), respectively. These are based on U.S. data for 3-digit
ISIC sectors, which we match to the HS-8 products in our data.
4.1 Comparing prices across products
Our empirical strategy critically rests on the comparison of prices across a firm’s product range.
Conceptually, we are interested in how quality differs across products, where quality is inter-
preted as the utility consumers derive from a single physical unit of a product. This poses an
obvious challenge: Given both horizontal and vertical differentiation across products, we cannot
characterize the quality of different goods in a firm’s production portfolio in absolute terms. We
can, however, rate them in relative terms based on how they compare to the average variety
available on the market in their respective product category.
As an illustrative example, consider a firm that sells both printers and cell phones. Let its
printer be qp times better than the average printer on the market and its cell phone be qc times
better than the average cell phone on the market, where qp > qc. Through the lens of our model,
we would ascribe qp and qc as the quality levels of the firm’s printer and cell phone, respectively.
We would moreover expect that the firm’s core competence is in manufacturing printers, while
cell phones are its peripheral good.
We implement this approach by demeaning every export (import) unit value by the average
observed across all firms exporting (importing) that HS 8-digit product category. For example,
if firm f charges log pricefp for HS 8-digit product p, and the average log export price across all
Chinese firms selling p is log pricep, then we use log pricefp − log pricep as a standardized price
that we can compare across f ’s different HS 8-digit products. When we examine f ’s operations
in a particular destination d, we are careful to demean its export prices by the relevant averages
across Chinese exporters to that specific market. In other words, if f ships products p and p′ to
country d, we will compare log pricefpd − log pricepd to log pricefp′d − log pricep′d. Our results
for bilateral exports are however not sensitive to this choice of demeaning, and also obtain if we
subtract the global log pricep and log pricep′ averages instead.
Working with log prices instead of prices is motivated by two reasons. First, it is what theory
calls for, given that we will estimate model-based equations in their log-linear form with Ordinary
Least Squares. Second, by demeaning log prices we obtain the distance between a firm’s price
from the market average in percentage terms rather than in absolute levels. This facilitates the
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comparison of prices across products by accounting for differences across product categories in
both the first and the second moments of the price distribution.
4.2 A first glance at the data
Table 1 illustrates the substantial variation in export prices across the 176,116 Chinese manufac-
turers, 7,481 export products, and 239 destination countries in the unbalanced 2002-2006 panel.
Consider first the average price of each firm-product-year triplet, constructed as the ratio of
annual worldwide sales and quantities across all destinations served d, pricefpt =
∑
d revenuefpdt∑
d quantityfpdt
.
After removing product-year pair fixed effects, the mean log price in the data is 0.00 (by construc-
tion), with a standard deviation of 1.32 across goods and manufacturers. There is comparable
dispersion at the firm-product-destination-year level, with an average log price of 0.00 (by con-
struction) and standard deviation of 1.24.
Prices vary considerably across Chinese producers selling the same HS 8-digit product, to the
same country, in a given year: The standard deviation of firm prices in the average destination-
product-year market is 0.89. This highlights the extent of firm heterogeneity in the data.
There is also a lot of variation in unit values across products within firms. The standard
deviation of demeaned log prices across goods within a firm-year is 0.84 on average when we
consider worldwide exports. This number remains high at 0.75 when we instead look at the
spread of bilateral export prices across products for the average firm-destination-year triplet.
This demonstrates the heterogeneity in product attributes across an exporter’s merchandise.
Table 2 indicates that the variation in unit values across products within multi-product firms
is not random: Export prices and revenues are in fact systematically positively correlated across
a manufacturer’s product range. For each year in our sample, we rank each firm’s products twice,
once based on their worldwide sales and once based on their export price. The best selling or
most expensive good is ranked first, the second most receives second rank, etc. We thus obtain
every firm’s global product ranking by sales and by price.
Table 2 shows that firms’ top-selling varieties tend to be their most expensive ones. Each
cell in the table reports what fraction of all firm-product pairs receive a certain rank by price
(rows) and sales (columns), averaging across years in the panel. A firm’s leading product by
export revenues is often also its most or second-most expensive product (45%=5.47/12.19 and
19%=2.27/12.19 of the time, respectively). Similarly, a firm’s most expensive product is usually
ranked first or second by export revenues (45% and 18% of the time, respectively). Moreover, the
entries along the diagonal contain the biggest fraction of firm-product pairs in any row or column.
In other words, across all products in a firm’s output basket, the price rank of a given product is
most likely to exactly coincide with its sales rank. We view these patterns as suggestive of quality
differentiation across products within a firm. In particular, exporters’ core expertise appears to
lie in expensive, high-quality goods that generate the most revenues, whereas peripheral products
are cheap, of low quality and contributing little to sales.
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Appendix Table 2 provides additional summary statistics for the variation in export revenues
across firms, destinations, products and years, as well as in export quality which we infer from
the data on export prices and quantities as described below.
5 Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. In Section 5.1, we first revisit evidence in the
prior literature that constitutes a starting point for our analysis and informs Proposition 1. We
document a positive correlation between export prices and revenues across manufacturers of the
same product category, which we interpret as consistent with quality differentiation across firms.
We next turn to our novel contribution, and examine the variation in market activity across
products within firms. In Section 5.2, we test the central predictions of Proposition 2. We
establish several empirical results which together suggest that multi-product firms use inputs of
different quality levels in order to produce goods of different quality levels. Moreover, a firm’s
core competence is determined by product quality, such that its higher-quality goods command
higher prices and generate higher revenues. In Section 5.3, we then study the relationship between
product scope, export revenues, average price, and sales skewness across destinations within a
firm, as per Propositions 3 and 4. Our findings indicate that firms concentrate activity towards
their core, high-quality goods in markets where they offer fewer products and earn lower export
revenues. This occurs through adjustments both on the extensive margin of product scope and
on the intensive margin of product sales.
Our baseline analysis considers the cross-sectional variation in export activity across firms
and products in the 2002-2006 panel. This allows us to directly project theoretical predictions
onto the data. In Section 5.4, we provide additional corroborative evidence based on multi-
product firms’ export dynamics. This time-series evidence is consistent with firms’ expected
response to changes in the econonomic environment within our conceptual framework, and helps
validate the economic mechanisms of interest.
5.1 Variation across firms within a product
Past work has documented that export prices and revenues are positively correlated across firms
within narrow segments of the global economy, such as finely disaggregated product categories
or country-product markets. In light of Proposition 1, this is indicative of quality differentiation
across firms, with more successful exporters offering better-quality goods at higher prices.
Appendix Table 3 confirms that these patterns hold in our data as well. In the spririt of
Manova-Zhang (2012) who study the cross-section of China’s trade transactions in 2005, we
regress log export unit values on log export revenues by firm, product, destination, and year.
Controlling for destination-product-year triple fixed effects, we find a positive and significant
coefficient. The point estimates suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in export revenues
is accompanied by 20% higher free-on-board export prices. This association is moreover stronger
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for products with arguably greater scope for quality differentiation, such as differentiated goods
and sectors intensive in R&D and advertising. Column 6 shows that a theoretically-motivated
proxy for product quality is likewise positively correlated with export revenues across firms in a
given market; we describe this proxy in more detail below.
5.2 Variation across products within a firm
5.2.1 Export prices and export revenues
We now turn to the variation in export activity across products within multi-product firms as
informed by Proposition 2. We first consider the relationship between exporters’ global sales and
prices by product. For each year, we aggregate the data to the firm-product level by summing
trade revenues and quantities across markets. We then take their ratio and construct firm f ’s
average export price for product p across all destinations d it serves in year t as pricefpt =∑
d revenuefpdt∑
d quantityfpdt
. In order to make these prices comparable across goods, we demean them by their
product-year specific average across firms. For notational simplicity, ln pricefpt below always
refers to these demeaned log prices.
We estimate the following specification:
ln pricefpt = α+ β ln revenuefpt + δft + εfpt, (2)
where revenuefpt =
∑
d revenuefpdt. As per our model, we include firm-year fixed effects δft to
account for systematic differences in ability across exporters, as well as for changes in this ability
level within firms over time. These fixed effects also control for all observed and unobserved firm
characteristics outside our model that affect trade outcomes symmetrically across the product
range, such as productivity, managerial competence, fixed capital equipment, worker skill, dis-
tribution networks, or experience in foreign markets. At this level of aggregation, the sample
comprises 4,127,779 observations spanning 175,949 firms and 7,477 products. We cluster errors
by firm throughout the paper, to allow for correlated shocks within firms over time.15 Our results
are robust to alternative treatments of the error term, such as clustering by product, by both
firm and product, or by destination (where relevant).
We are primarily interested in β, which reflects the sign of the conditional correlation between
export price and revenues across goods within a firm. The sign of this correlation allows us to
evaluate the importance of product quality for the operations of multi-product exporters. In
particular, β > 0 would be consistent with quality sorting and θ > 0 in the model, while β < 0
would correspond to efficiency sorting and θ < 0. We emphasize that we cannot and do not want
15This is motivated by the likely structure of the error term. The δft account for supply and demand shocks
that might be correlated across products within a firm at a given point in time, while demeaning the left-hand side
variable by product-year accommodates possible correlated shocks across firms exporting the same product in the
same year. Clustering by firm addresses the potential additional correlation in supply and demand shocks within
firms over time. For example, firms with more effective management might be less affected by negative aggregate
shocks than firms with weaker management subject to the same shocks.
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to give β a causal interpretation, since unit values and sales are joint outcomes of producers’
profit maximization and are both determined by firm ability and product expertise.
The results in Table 3 lend strong support to quality differentiation across a firm’s products.
Within firms, more expensive goods generate systematically higher global sales. The estimates
in Column 1 imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in exports is associated with 10.6%
higher prices. Column 2 confirms that this result is unrelated to the variation in a company’s
market power across products, which could influence its pricing strategy for reasons outside our
model. For instance, strategic interactions among firms could lead them to charge variable mark-
ups that depend on their market presence relative to competitors. For each product p and year
t, we proxy firm f ’s market power with its share of total Chinese exports of p,
revenuefpt∑
f revenuefpt
,
where the sum in the denominator is taken over all firms exporting p.
We conduct two further sensitivity analyses to ensure that our findings are not driven by
measurement error (ME) in export values or quantities that could bias β.16 First, we explore the
variation in the scope for quality differentiation across products using three common measures
for θ in the model. In Column 3, we regress export prices on export revenues, the Rauch (1999)
indicator for differentiated goods, and the interaction of the two. The rational for this diff-
in-diff approach is that while ME might be present, it arguably does not vary systematically
across industries. ME is thus more likely to affect β than the coefficient on the interaction
term. Indeed, the positive correlation between export prices and revenues is 73% higher for
differentiated products. Similar results obtain in Columns 4 and 5 when we instead proxy θ with
sectors’ R&D intensity or combined advertising and R&D intensity. For example, prices increase
5.4 percentage points faster with revenues in an industry with 20% higher R&D intensity. All of
these patterns are highly significant at 1%-5%.
As a second specification check, we study the rank of firms’ export price and revenues instead
of their level. This allows us to rely much less directly on the construction of unit prices. We
order each manufacturer’s products based on its worldwide sales, such that the top-selling good
is ranked first, the second-most receives rank 2, etc. We also array firms’ products by their
demeaned unit values. We allow for changes in firms’ product hierarchy over time by calculating
these rankings separately for each year. As Column 6 illustrates, there is a strong positive
correlation between products’ global rank by price and by revenue across goods within exporters.
In unreported regressions, we have confirmed that this correlation increases with sectors’ scope
for quality differentiation. These results reinforce our conclusion that β > 0 is not driven by ME
bias, since such bias would have to be severe to systematically distort product rankings.
We next perform a more stringent test of the model and examine the variation across ex-
porters’ goods within specific destination markets. We estimate an expanded version of equation
16See Manova-Zhang (2012) for a discussion of why the direction of such bias is ex-ante ambiguous and depends
on the nature of ME in revenues and/or quantities. They also show that the correlation of price and revenue is
not mechanically positive by construction.
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(2) with the firm-product-country-year quadruplet as the unit of observation:
ln pricefpdt = α+ β ln revenuefpdt + δfdt + εfpdt. (3)
Here ln pricefpdt is firm f ’s log price for product p in destination d in year t, after it has been
demeaned by the product-country-year specific average price. Similarly, bilateral instead of
global trade values enter on the right-hand side. We include firm-destination-year triple fixed
effects δfdt, which implicitly account for the variation in total expenditure, trade costs, consumer
price indices, and market toughness across countries as directed by theory. The δfdt dummies
additionally control for cross-country differences in consumer preferences and other institutional
frictions that are outside our model, as well as for firms’ market-specific distribution networks
and export experience. For simplicity, we use the same coefficient notation in all estimating
equations, although the coefficients differ conceptually across specifications.
As evidenced in Table 4, exporters earn higher revenues from their more expensive products
not only in terms of worldwide sales, but also within each destination. This correlation is not
driven by differences in market power across a firm’s product lines, which we now proxy with
bilateral market shares
revenuefpdt∑
f revenuefpdt
. The relationship is also significantly stronger for goods
with greater scope for quality upgrading. It is furthermore robust to using products’ price and
revenue ranks instead of levels, where these ranks have been constructed separately for each firm,
year, and importing country based on bilateral sales.
Overall, the point estimates in Table 4 and their statistical significance are very similar to
those for global exports in Table 3. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in bilateral
exports is accompanied by 9.5% higher bilateral unit values. This comovement in export sales and
prices across products within firms amounts to half of the corresponding comovement across firms
within product markets reported in the previous section. This signals the empirical relevance of
the model in rationalizing both patterns in the data.
5.2.2 Inferred export quality and export revenues
The results in Tables 3 and 4 show that firms’ best-selling products are their most expensive
varieties. In our model, this outcome obtains only when there is quality variation across goods
within a firm, and when it is sufficiently powerful to dominate the price effects of efficiency hetero-
geneity, i.e. θ > 0. It is thus possible that firms actively vary quality across their product range,
but this force is overpowered by the correlated variation in production efficiency across goods.
A separate concern is that theoretical frameworks other than the ones we have considered might
generate a positive relationship between prices and revenues without the quality mechanism.
The systematic patterns that we document across sectors with different potential for quality
upgrading go a long way towards establishing our quality interpretation. Nevertheless, we would
ideally like to show corroborative evidence using direct measures of product quality. In the
absence of such information, we first construct an indicator q̂fpt for unobserved product quality
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qfpt from observed data on export quantities xfpt and prices pfpt. We proxy quality with ln q̂fpt =
σ lnxfpt + ln pfpt, where we set the elasticity of substitution across varieties at the commonly
used value σ = 5; our results are robust to alternative choices over σ. This quality proxy can be
structurally motivated in theoretical models that feature CES preferences and constant mark-ups
such as Khandelwal (2008), and it has been used for example in Khandelwal et al (2013) and
Fan et al (2015). We remove product-year fixed effects from this calculation to ensure that prices
and quantities are comparable across products.
The results in Column 7 of Table 3 reveal that export revenues are positively correlated with
inferred quality ln q̂fpt across products within a firm. In Column 7 of Table 4, we similarly find a
strong positive correlation between bilateral export revenues and quality across products within
a firm-destination, where we impute market-specific product quality as ln q̂fpdt = σ lnxfpdt +
ln pfpdt. We obtain substantially higher point estimates than in our baseline price regressions in
Column 1, suggesting that firms’ core products feature both high quality and high production
efficiency as manifested in low quality-adjusted prices. A one-standard-deviation rise in bilateral
export revenues is on average attained with 280% higher product quality. While this evidence
is consistent with the quality channel we emphasize, an important caveat is that q̂fpt and q̂fpdt
would not accurately proxy product quality in theoretical frameworks with variable mark-ups.
5.2.3 Export prices and imported-input prices
To more conclusively establish the quality mechanism, we exploit the rich nature of our data
to obtain measures for the quality of firms’ inputs in production. A large number of Chinese
exporters use imported inputs (59% of all exporters and 57% of all exporter-year observations),
and the customs files record all such input purchases. While we do not observe manufacturers’
use of domestic materials, inputs, and labor, we can therefore use the prices they pay for imported
parts as an indicator for the quality of all of their inputs. A positive correlation between this
indicator and export prices across a firm’s products would then signal that producers vary the
quality of their outputs by using inputs of different quality levels.17
Combining information on input and output prices has two additional advantages. From an
economics perspective, input prices in principle capture the objective quality of an input and,
by extension, its resultant output; output prices by contrast reflect both products’ objective
quality and consumers’ subjective quality valuation. From an econometrics perspective, input
and output prices are obtained from independent data series, such that their relationship is not
subject to ME concerns that could bias the correlation between output sales and prices.
Operationalizing this methodology poses some challenges. We are interested in exporters that
make multiple products using multiple intermediates. For each firm f and product p at time
t, we would thus like to calculate ln input pricefpt, the average input price across all imported
17If such a positive correlation instead reflected producers passing on cost shocks to consumers for reasons
outside our model, we would have observed a negative correlation between export prices and revenues, as in that
case higher export prices would have implied less efficient production rather than higher quality.
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inputs that f uses to manufacture p. We therefore need to allocate inputs to outputs in order
to develop quality proxies that vary across products within a firm. We pursue two different
strategies, and find very similar results that are consistent with quality differentiation.
We first focus on foreign inputs in the same broad industry classification as the output
product. For example, if a firm buys tyres and steering wheels and sells cars, both its exports
and imports would be recorded in the automobile industry. The average price across the tyres
and wheels that it uses would then proxy the quality of the cars that it makes. If the company
also manufactures cell phones, the price that it pays for SIM cards would enter the measured
quality of its cell phones but not that of its cars.
Recall that we observe trade flows by HS 8-digit product. For every producer f , we construct
a weighted average log input price across all materials that f imports (e.g. tyres, steering wheels)
in a given HS 3-digit category (e.g. vehicles), which we label ln input priceHS3fpt . We use import
values as weights, but our results are robust to taking an unweighted average instead.18 We assign
ln input priceHS3fpt to all HS 8-digit products p that f exports in a given HS 3-digit industry (e.g.
cars and trucks). This allows us to obtain input quality proxies for 25% of the observations at
the firm-export product-year level in our data, for a sample of 1,031,424 observations.
Our second approach to matching firms’ imported inputs to exported products relies on
detailed input-output tables for China. These tables report the total value of inputs used from
one sector for production in another sector, in a matrix of 139 sectors. The relative contribution
of two inputs varies significantly across output sectors. For example, manufacturing a car might
require tyres, multiple LED displays and some cloth for upholstery; assembling a cell phone
might demand only one display, no tyres and no cloth; and sewing a dress might need only cloth.
For each firm, we can therefore apply the input-output tables to allocate some part of its
every imported input to each of its exported products. Let uij be the value of input i used in
the production of sector j in the IO tables. Let the set of sectors j exported by firm f be J . We
assume that a share
uij∑
jǫJ uij
of f ’s total imports of i are employed in manufacturing j. Using
these inferred input values as weights, we construct the weighted average input price for firm f ’s
output j across its inputs i in year t.19 We refer to this measure as ln input priceIOfpt, and assign
it to all HS-8 digit products that f exports in IO sector j. This generates input quality proxies
for 58% of the observations at the firm-export product-year level in our data, for a sample of
2,403,309 observations.
We believe that parsing out inputs to outputs in this way is informative if imperfect. It
gauges the variation in marginal costs across a firm’s products in a more comprehensive way
than focusing only on inputs within the same narrow sector as the output, as we did for ln input
priceHS3fpt . At the same time, companies need not necessarily combine intermediates in the same
proportion as in the IO tables. To the extent that individual firms’ input sourcing strategy
18Before this manipulation, we demean all import prices by their product-year specific average across firms.
This makes import prices comparable across inputs and parallels our standardization of export prices.
19As before, we use import prices demeaned by their product-specific average import price across firms.
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and production process deviate from the aggregate patterns reflected in the IO tables, this
would introduce classical measurement error and bias our results downwards. For robustness, in
unreported regressions we have considered a slightly different formula for ln input priceIOfpt and
reassuringly obtained very similar results.20
We examine the relationship between producers’ output and input prices by estimating:
ln pricefpt = α+ β ln input pricefpt + δft + εfpt, (4)
where ln pricefpt is firm f ’s demeaned export price for product p in year t based on worldwide
sales. We measure ln input pricefpt with either ln input price
HS3
fpt (Panel A of Table 5) or ln input
priceIOfpt (Panel B); the two deliver point estimates of comparable magnitude and significance. As
before, we exploit purely the variation across output goods within a manufacturer by including
firm-year pair fixed effects δft. We are once again interested in β as a conditional correlation that
does not permit a causal interpretation: The choices of input and output quality are intimately
related in exporters’ profit maximization problem in a framework with endogenous quality choice.
Consistently with our theoretical predictions for θ > 0, we find a highly statistically and
economically significant positive association between input and output prices across products
within a firm. Our baseline in Column 1 indicates an elasticity of 0.11 to 0.13. These results
are robust to explicitly controlling for manufacturers’ market power both in the output market
for their export goods and in the input market for their imported parts (Column 2). As earlier,
we capture the former with f ’s share of total Chinese exports of output product p in year t,
revenuefpt∑
f revenuefpt
. To measure the latter symmetrically, for each year we average f ’s share of total
Chinese imports across all of its inputs that are matched to its output product p and used in the
calculation of ln input pricefpt.
21
Through the lens of our model, we interpret this as strong evidence that Chinese exporters use
inputs of different quality levels to produce goods of different quality levels. To shed more light
on this mechanism, we re-estimate equation (4) separately for homogeneous and differentiated
export products in Columns 3 and 4. Firms’ export prices rise substantially more quickly with
their input prices when the output product is differentiated. This is in line with the model’s
prediction that output price and quality increase faster with marginal cost and input quality in
sectors with greater scope for quality differentiation (i.e. higher θ).
Our results survive two additional sensitivity checks. All Chinese customs transactions are
recorded as occurring under one of two main trade regimes: processing and ordinary trade.22
20In particular, we constructed the weighted average input price using the ratios
uij∑
iǫI uij
as weights without
exploiting information on firms’ import values. These weights implicitly assume that all firms use different inputs i
in the same proportion when making a given product j. This is the counterpart to the assumption behind ln input
priceIOfpt that all firms allocate a given input i in the same proportion across different outputs j.
21It is not obvious ex ante whether and how market power would enter. Manufacturing more of a certain product
requires bigger input quantities. A bigger export market share might thus allow firms to charge higher mark-ups
and to negotiate lower input prices. This would tend to bias β downwards. On the other hand, input scarcity or
convexity in production costs might bias β upwards.
22See Manova-Yu (2016) among others for more details on these regimes.
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Processing firms import inputs specifically for further processing, assembly, and re-exporting.
Ordinary exporters may or may not use imported materials when producing for foreign markets.
Since we have removed all trade intermediaries from our sample, we can interpret the import
transactions of both ordinary and processing exporters as purchases of foreign inputs. We have
nevertheless confirmed that all patterns in Table 5 hold when we focus on processing imports
only. Column 5 replicates our baseline regression for this subsample.
We also verify that our results are not driven by potential aggregation bias in the matching
of inputs to outputs. By design, the two algorithms we use can map multiple HS 8-digit export
products to the same imported-input price (at the HS 3-digit or IO-sector level). In Column
6, we collapse the data such that output prices on the left-hand side are at the same level of
aggregation as input prices on the right-hand side. Our results continue to hold, with the point
estimate for β increasing. All findings in Columns 2-5 also obtain at this level of aggregation.
Finally, Column 7 shows that a strong positive relationship holds not only between input and
output prices, but also between inferred input and output quality across products within a firm.
Following the same methodology as in Section 5.2.2, we back out proxies for the quality of every
imported input at the firm-product-country level from the available information on import prices
and quantities. For each of a firm f ’s output products p, we construct ln input qualityHS3fpt and
ln input qualityIOfpt as the weighted average quality of f ’s imported inputs used in the production
of p, based on the same assignment of inputs to output products as above. In line with our
quality interpretation, we observe β > 0 when we re-estimate equation (4) replacing input and
output price levels with their respective imputed quality.
5.3 Variation across destinations within a firm
The analysis so far has established robust positive correlations between export prices, export
revenues, input prices, and inferred quality across a manufacturer’s product range. As per
Proposition 2, these results are consistent with quality differentiation across products within
multi-product firms, whereby exporters earn higher revenues from their core expensive goods
that are of superior quality.
We next examine how exporters adjust their product scope and sales distribution across
destinations. Our interest here is not in the underlying differences across markets that trigger
such adjustments, but rather in the attributes of the goods that firms choose to offer and to sell
more of when they adjust their product range. This analysis is guided by Propositions 3 and 4.
5.3.1 Product scope and product hierarchies
We first study how firms vary their export activity across destination countries along the extensive
marginf product entry. Specifically, we assess the extent to which exporters observe a product
hierarchy by introducing their core products in all markets and progressively adding goods that
they have less expertise in when they enlarge the set of products on offer. We also study how
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average prices and average inferred quality change with the number of traded products, to gauge
to what extent firms’ product hierarchy is determined by efficiency vs. quality sorting.
We begin with the joint variation in product scope, average price and export revenues across
destinations within a company. For each firm f , country d and year t, we obtain total bilateral ex-
ports, revenuefdt =
∑
p revenuefpdt, and record the number of products shipped, Nproductsfdt.
We construct the simple average log price across the products that f sells to d at time t, after
these prices have been demeaned by their product-destination-year average. We likewise compute
the weighted average of these demeaned prices, using firms’ bilateral exports as weights.
We evaluate the implications of Propositions 3 and 4 for the extensive margin of multi-product
firms’ exports by estimating:
ln revenuefdt = α+ β lnNproductsfdt + δft + εfdt and (5)
ln avg pricefdt = α+ β lnNproductsfdt + δft + εfdt.
Given the firm-year pair fixed effects δft in these regressions, β is identified purely from the
cross-sectional variation across countries within manufacturers. As before, it reflects conditional
correlations of interest and does not support a causal interpretation: In the model, product
scope, export revenues and average prices are jointly pinned down by a producer’s ability draw
and characteristics of the destination market.
In line with our theoretical predictions, exporters earn systematically higher revenues in coun-
tries where they sell more products (Column 1 of Table 6). At the same time, product scope
is negatively correlated with the average price across products (Column 2). This pattern is not
driven by cross-country differences in a firm’s market power, as proxied by the average market
share across its products in a destination-year (Column 3). Moreover, it holds in the sample
of differentiated goods with potential for quality upgrading, but is absent among homogeneous
commodities (Columns 4 and 5). Finally, the theoretically ambiguous relationship between prod-
uct scope and the revenue-weighted average price is markedly less negative and not statistically
different from 0 (Column 6).
These relationships are economically significant. The typical firm generates 85% higher bi-
lateral revenues and lowers its average bilateral f.o.b. price by 1% when it exports 50% more
products to a given destination. The latter correlation is 20% higher for differentiated varieties.
Through the lens of our model, these results suggest that exporters expand (restrict) their
product offering across markets by consistently exporting core expensive varieties of high quality
and adding (dropping) peripheral cheaper goods of inferior quality. In particular, Proposition 3
indicates that a firm’s number of products and their average price would be negatively associated
only with quality sorting (θ > 0), but not with efficiency sorting. This conclusion is further
bolstered by the results in Columns 7-8, where we re-estimate equation (5) for the average inferred
output quality across a firm’s products, rather than their average price. Moreover, compared to
the simple average quality, the weighted average quality is not only less negatively correlated,
but it is in fact significantly positively correlated with product scope across destinations within a
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firm-year. In light of Proposition 3, this illustrates the large adjustments that firms make across
markets, both along the extensive margin of product scope and along the intensive margin of
product sales.
While the evidence in Table 6 points to the validity of Propositions 3 and 4 for the case of
quality sorting, it does not directly establish whether firms adhere to the same global product
hierarchy in all destinations. We next present empirical patterns consistent with an important
role for such a hierarchy. While the exact rankings of products by export sales, by price, and by
inferred quality do differ to some degree across the multiple markets that a firm serves, the data
suggest that such deviations from a strict product hierarchy are small in magnitude.
We begin with informative summary statistics. For each firm-destination pair, we obtain the
cross-product correlation between the global and the bilateral revenue rank of products in the
firm’s export portfolio. We record the average and the standard deviation of these correlations
across destinations within each firm. For the median firm, the average correlation is 0.69, with a
standard deviation of 0.30. We then ask how much of the total variation in product ranks across
products and destinations within a firm can be ascribed to fixed factors at the firm-product
level. In particular, we regress the bilateral rank of product p exported by firm f to destination
d on firm-product pair fixed effects. The R-squared from this regression is very high at 0.85 in
the cross-section for year 2006, and increases further to 0.93 when we control for the number of
firms’ bilaterally exported products.
We next systematically examine the relationship between the number of products that a firm
sells in a given market and where these products enter in the firm’s global product ranking.
We first consider the agnostic ranking of firm f ’s products based on their global sales, ignoring
the underlying cause for this ranking. For each company and year, the good that generates
the highest revenues worldwide receives rank 1, the second-highest revenues - rank 2, etc. We
record the average, minimum and maximum ranks observed across the products that f sells to
destination d in year t. If the exporter follows a strict product ladder in all countries, then the
minimum global product rank would be 1 in every market. The maximum rank, on the other
hand, would equal the number of products shipped, Nproductsfdt. Thus, product scope would be
uncorrelated with the minimum product rank across destinations within a firm-year, but it would
be positively correlated with the maximum and with the average product rank. Deviations from
these patterns would signal that firms do not maintain a strict product hierarchy, and instead
re-order products across markets. In practice, we work with the 10th and 90th percentiles instead
of the minimum and the maximum ranks to guard against idiosyncratic outliers.23
We evaluate these predictions by regressing each of the three relevant rank measures on the
number of bilaterally traded products in specifications at the firm-destination-year level. Firm-
year pair fixed effects ensure that the conditional correlation β is estimated from the variation
23Qualitatively similar results obtain if we instead use these extreme values.
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across markets within an exporter at a given point in time:
{avg rankfdt,min rankfdt,max rankfdt} = α+ βNproductsfdt + δft + εfdt. (6)
As Panel A of Table 7 shows, the average sales product rank indeed rises significantly with
product scope. This pattern is more pronounced among differentiated goods, although it is also
present among homogeneous varieties. Moreover, the 90th percentile rank increases about twice
as fast with the number of goods shipped as the average, whereas the 10th percentile rank is
essentially unaffected.
We next impose more structure on the origin of product hierarchies in firms’ export portfolios,
and rank products based on their global price (i.e. global sales / global quantities) instead of
their global sales. Now in each year, exporters’ most expensive product receives rank 1, their
second-most expensive product - rank 2, etc. We similarly develop a global product ladder for
each firm and year based on inferred product quality.
In Panels B and C of Table 7, we re-estimate equation (6) using exporters’ global price and
quality product rankings. We obtain qualitatively similar results as in Panel A with two excep-
tions. The average rank becomes independent of or very weakly correlated with product scope for
non-differentiated products, which strengthens our conclusions. While the 10 th percentile now
falls with Nproductsfdt, the important observation for our purposes is that the 90
th percentile
rises faster than that in absolute terms.
Together, Tables 6 and 7 suggest that exporters’ core competence lies with their expensive
products, which correspond to their highest-quality goods. In destinations where firms choose
to offer fewer varieties, they focus on these high-quality, core products. At the same time,
product hierarchies are not perfectly observed across destinations as per the baseline model.
This is consistent with unobserved supply and demand shocks at the product-destination or
firm-product-destination level, such as variation in transportation costs and in consumer tastes
as in Bernard et al (2010).24
5.3.2 Product scope and sales distribution
We next examine how firms vary their export activity across destination countries along the
intensive margin. We consider the distribution of sales across products within a firm, and assess
if and how product scope relates to the concentration of sales towards core goods. This is
informative because according to Proposition 4, such a systematic relationship would emerge
only in frameworks with variable mark-ups, but not in environments with constant mark-ups
and monopolistic competition.
24For completeness, we have checked that the results for the variation across destinations within firms in Tables
6 and 7 also apply to the variation across firms within a destination-year. We do so by re-estimating the relevant
equations with destination-year instead of firm-year fixed effects. This implies that within a market, firms exporting
more products have higher revenues and focus on their core expensive goods. These findings are consistent with
the model and further corroborate our interpretaion.
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For each firm f , destination d and year t, we measure export sales concentration with
the log ratio of the revenues generated by f ’s top and second-best product in d at time t,
ln (revenuefdt,1/revenuefdt,2).
25 We identify these top two products in three different ways,
based on bilateral export sales, prices, or inferred qualities. We rely on firms’ bilateral trade
activity to account for the fact that they may not observe the same product hierarchy in all
markets. We regress each concentration ratio on the exporter’s log number of products sold in
destination d and year t. Since we are interested in the variation across importing countries
within a firm, we include firm-year pair fixed effects δft:
ln (revenuefdt,1/revenuefdt,2) = α+ β lnNproductsfdt + δft + εfdt. (7)
As Table 8 shows, firms skew their exports more towards their top-selling, most expensive,
and highest-quality good in markets where they sell fewer varieties (Columns 1, 4, 7). Halving the
product range is associated with a 21% rise in revenues from the best-selling product relative to
the second-best. This number reaches 8.5% when we consider the concentration of sales towards
the most expensive good, and 15.5% when we instead focus on the concentration of sales towards
the highest-quality product. In the rest of Table 7 we estimate equation (7) separately for firms’
homogeneous and differentiated products, and document that qualitatively similar results hold
for both categories.26
In unreported regressions, we have confirmed that similar results obtain when we use an
alternative measure of sales concentration: the Herfindahl index for the distribution of bilateral
exports across all of f ’s products sold to destination d. An advantage of this measure is that
it takes into account the complete sales distribution across f ’s full product range, rather than
the relative sales of the top two products alone. However, it provides a consistency check only
for Column 1, where products are ranked based on sales. It cannot shed light on the attributes
(production efficiency, product quality) of the products that generate high revenues.
These findings imply that in tougher markets where firms opt to sell fewer products, they
shift activity towards their core, high-quality goods both along the extensive margin (by dropping
lower-quality varieties) and along the intensive margin (by concentrating sales further towards
high-quality products). In light of Proposition 4, these patterns are inconsistent with the constant
mark-ups implied by the combination of CES demand and monopolistic competition. Instead,
they suggest that variable mark-ups importantly affect the sales decisions of multi-product firms,
where such variable mark-ups may arise from deviations from CES demand, monopolistic com-
petition, and/or cross-product independence in production or consumption.
25As Melitz et al (2014), we use the log ratio in order to capture the relative contribution of different products
in percentage terms.
26Of note, the concentration of sales towards expensive and towards high-quality products falls faster with
product scope for differentiated varieties than for homogeneous goods. On the other hand, the opposite is true of
the concentration of sales towards the best-selling product.
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5.4 Export dynamics within firms over time
The analysis so far has examined the cross-sectional variation in export activity across firms,
products, and destinations. This elucidates how firms make decisions about their optimal product
scope and revenues in each consumer market, given the prevailing market conditions at a certain
point in time. It also informs how firms determine the level and cross-sectional distribution of
product quality, prices, and sales across country-product markets.
In this section, we provide complementary evidence on how multi-product, multi-quality firms
adjust their export activity in response to changes in economic conditions over time. In particular,
we examine the pattern of reallocation across products within firms along the extensive margin
of product entry and exit, as well as along the intensive margin of changes in sales levels and
concentration among surviving products.
The static conceptual framework in Section 2 can be generalized to accommodate exogenous
supply and demand shocks. Consider first shocks that affect all products symmetrically, such
as aggregate expenditure growth in a given destination which raises demand proportionately for
all varieties. Propositions 3 and 4 would have clear predictions for exporters’ optimal response:
Conditional on expanding export activity and sales, firms will enlarge their export product
scope by going down their product ladder and adding more of their peripheral goods. Compared
to surviving varieties, these newly introduced products will generate lower revenues and sell
at higher (lower) prices under efficiency (quality) sorting. In addition, firms will preserve the
concentration of sales among inframarginal varieties in the case of constant mark-ups, but reduce
it under variable mark-ups. Conversely, negative shocks would induce firms to contract total
export sales by narrowing their product range, dropping marginal varieties that occupy the
bottom of the product hierarchy, and possibly skewing sales further towards the top inframarginal
products that survive.
Consider next supply and demand shocks that differentially affect products, such as exogenous
shifts in product-specific input costs or consumer tastes. Such shocks would reorder the ranking
of products by profitability in a firm’s output portfolio. As a result, should firms optimally choose
to increase total exports (for example because of a large positive shock across the board), they
might introduce new varieties that generate higher sales and rank higher in terms of efficiency or
quality than incumbent products in their export basket. Moreover, firms might simultaneously
add and drop products. While the predictions of Proposition 4 regarding product scope and sales
concentration would still hold, the implications of Proposition 3 regarding product hiearchies
would remain qualitatively valid but quantitatively less relevant.
The analysis of firms’ export dynamics thus serves several purposes. First, it allows us to
assess how important the allocation of activity across products is to the operations of multi-
product firms, not only in the cross-section but also for export dynamics.
Second, export dynamics reveal to what extent firms’ product hierarchy is stable over time and
governed by the same factors as in the cross-section. As discussed above, product-specific shocks
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can reshuﬄe products’ relative profitability. Firms may also actively upgrade their production
technology to improve efficiency and/or quality, but the associated costs and returns may vary
across products. Either force could lead to product hierarchies changing significantly within
firms over time. Moreover, quality sorting might characterize the pattern of export activity in
the cross section in line with our results above, but reallocations across products over time might
be determined by differential adjustments in production efficiency.
Finally, panel analysis can inform how multi-product companies respond to trade reforms that
affect export opportunities. We can document how product characteristics prior to exogenous
policy shocks shape export behavior following reforms. In addition to being policy-relevant, this
exercise allows us to overcome outstanding concerns with endogeneity or omitted variable bias.
We perform our analysis in two different ways. We first study the export dynamics of all firms
surviving from the beginning to the end of our panel, and consider the change in their trade
behavior from 2002 to 2006. We can thus agnostically identify the roles of production efficiency
and product quality in guiding adjustments across products in the medium run, without taking
a stance on why firms choose to adjust export activity in the first place.
We then exploit the removal of export quotas under the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) in
2005, and explore the export dynamics of surviving firms in the textiles and apparel industry
in the short run from 2004 to 2006. We focus on the HS 6-digit product categories that are
considered affected by the reform because they faced binding quotas (i.e. exports prior to the
reform exceeded 90% of the quota level) and on the export destinations for which these quotas
applied (US and all EU countries). Although this reform impacted only 8.7% of the firm popu-
lation in 2004, exploring its effects has two benefits compared to the full-panel analysis. First,
it constituted a large, exogenous shock to foreign demand from the perspective of individual
producers, and indeed triggered rapid growth in aggregate exports of textiles and apparel. The
MFA episode thus identifies a precise rather than agnostic reason for exporters to expand trade
activity, and it has been exploited as an exogenous shock for identification purposes in several
studies (c.f. Khandelwal et al 2013, Manova-Yu 2016). Second, focusing on the textiles and
apparel industries serves as a case study of manufacturers that operate in a well-defined product
space and use relatively transparent production technologies.27
5.4.1 Adjustment across products within firms
We first evaluate how exporters reallocate activity across products by dropping some varieties
from their export portfolio, introducing new ones, and adjusting the sales of surviving goods.
27See Upward-Wang (2016) for complementary evidence that the MFA reform induced firms to expand their
product scope. We study instead the differential adjustments that firms made across their product range.
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We estimate the following three specifications at the firm-product level:
Dropfp,t=1 = α+ βProduct Attributefp,t=0 + δf + εfp, (8a)
Addfp,t=1 = α+ βProduct Attributefp,t=1 + δf + εfp, (8b)
∆ ln revenuefp = α+ βProduct Attributefp,t=0 + δf + εfp. (8c)
In equation (8a), the sample comprises all products p that firm f exports at time t = 0,
and the outcome variable Dropfp,t=1 is an indicator set to 1 if the firm does not export p at
time t = 1. In (8b), the sample comprises all products p that f exports at time t = 1, and
the outcome variable Addfp,t=1 is an indicator set to 1 if the firm did not export p at time
t = 0. In (8c), the sample comprises all surviving products p that f exports at both t = 0
and t = 1, and the outcome variable is the change in log export revenues from t = 0 to t = 1,
∆ ln revenuefp = ln revenuefp,t=1 − ln revenuefp,t=0. The explanatory variables of interest,
Product Attributefp,t=0 and Product Attributefp,t=1, refer to the log export revenue, price, or
quality of a firm’s product at time t = 0 and t = 1 respectively. We include firm fixed effects,
such that β is estimated from the variation in export dynamics across varieties within a firm.
The results in Table 9 reveal patterns strongly consistent with the implications of Proposition
3 for the evolution of multi-product firms’ exports over time. In Panel A, we study the balanced
panel of surviving firms in our data, such that t0 and t1 correspond to years 2002 and 2006. We
find that exporters are more likely to discontinue products that generate lower revenues, that
sell at lower prices, and that feature lower quality (Columns 1-3). In the quality-sorting version
of our conceptual framework, these are precisely the goods that would be classed as peripheral
and most prone to being cut when firms scale down operations. Likewise, the new varieties that
exporters introduce tend to have lower sales and quality than incumbent products, but they
do attain slightly higher prices (Columns 4-6). This is consistent with firms expanding their
product range by going further down their product ladder, if there is both quality and efficiency
differentiation across varieties and prices reflect their net effect on marginal costs.
These adjustments on the extensive margin of product scope are accompanied by reallocations
on the intensive margin of sales levels for inframarginal products: Goods that initially rank higher
on the product hierarchy in terms of sales, price, or quality experience less revenue growth over
time (Columns 7-9). In light of Proposition 4, this is in line with companies concentrating their
exports less in core varieties when they expand their product range. Having said that, these
findings are also consistent with product-scpecific shocks that re-order the product hierarchy
and generate mean reversion in product-level exports. The analysis in the next subsection,
however, provides more direct evidence in support of the former interpretation.
We obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results when we turn to the MFA reform in
Panel B. We now restrict the sample to firms in the textiles and apparel industries that enjoyed
a large exogenous increase in foreign demand in 2005, and set t0 and t1 to years 2004 and 2006,
respectively. In response to this policy shock, exporters systematically added (and occasionally
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dropped) products that rank lower on their product hierarchy as reflected in export sales, prices
and quality, while also flattening the distribution of sales across their product range. Of note,
the coefficient on initial product price turns from positive to negative and insignificant, lending
further support to quality sorting.
As a robustness check, in Appendix Table 4 we replicate this analysis using ordinal ranks
instead of continuous measures for the product attributes of interest (sales, price, quality). We
observe the same, highly significant patterns. (Note that as expected, β flips sign since a core
product with high attribute values receives a lower rank number by construction.) We further
establish that firms not only tend to add/drop products from the lower end of their product
hierarchy, but they also generally preserve the ranking of inframarginal products in their export
basket: There is a strong positive correlation between the initial and end ranks of surviving
varieties. This correlation is strongest when we rank products by sales (48.8%, 61.1%), but
remains high when we rank them by quality (40.8%, 45.6%) or price (32.4%, 35.4%).
5.4.2 Adjustment across destinations within firms
We next assess how firms adjust their export activity differentially across destination markets.
Changes in aggregate economic conditions that affect all products in an exporter’s output port-
folio are not perfectly correlated across countries. Similarly, product-level supply and demand
shocks can be destination-specific. We can thus exploit the variation across countries to further
evaluate the empirical relevance of Propositions 3 and 4 for export dynamics. We estimate the
following three specifications:
∆ ln revenuefd = α+ β∆lnNproductsfd + δf + εfd, (9a)
∆ ln (revenuefd,1/revenuefd,2) = α+ β∆lnNproductsfd + δf + εfd, (9b)
∆avg rankfd = α+ β∆Nproductsfd + δf + εfd. (9c)
The unit of observation in these specifications is now the firm-destination pair, and the sample
comprises all destination markets d that firm f serves at both t = 0 and t = 1. The explanatory
variable of interest is the change in the (log) number of products that f exports to d from t = 0
to t = 1. We include firm fixed effects to identify β from the variation in export patterns across
countries within a firm. We report our findings for the 2002-2006 long difference in the full panel
in Panel A of Table 10, and for the 2004-2006 short-term response to the MFA reform in Panel
B of Table 10.
Equations (9a) and (9b) speak to the validity of Proposition 4. In (9a), the outcome vari-
able is the change in firm f ’s log exports to destination d, ∆ ln revenuefd = ln revenuefd,t=1 −
ln revenuefd,t=0. As Column 1 indicates, expanding their product scope in a given market indeed
allows firms to generate higher sales there. In (9b), the outcome variable is the change in sales
concentration in f ’s core products, ∆ ln (revenuefd,1/revenuefd,2) = ln (revenuefd1,t=1/revenuefd2,t=1)−
ln (revenuefd1,t=0/revenuefd2,t=0). As in Table 8, we measure sales concentration with the log
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ratio of exports of the top and second-best product, where these two products are ranked based
on bilateral export sales, prices, and inferred qualities. Columns 2-4 show that widening the
product range is accompanied by flattening the sales distribution across products, as indirectly
implied by the evidence for product-level sales in Table 9.
Finally, equation (9c) provides further support for Proposition 3. The outcome variable is
now the change in the average global rank across the products that firm f sells in country d,
∆avg rankfd = avg rankfd,t=1 − avg rankfd,t=0. As in Table 7, for each year t = 0 and t = 1,
we first rank f ’s products globally based on their worldwide sales, price, and inferred quality.
We then take the average of these global ranks across the varieties exported bilaterally to d. If
firms observe the same global product hierarchy in all markets at a given point in time, then
∆avg rankfd will increase with ∆Nproductsfd, even if this global product hierarchy changes over
time because of aggregate or product-level shocks that are not destination-specific. This is in
fact what we find in Columns 5-7. By contrast, if firms experienced destination-product specific
shocks that dominated any aggregate or product-level shocks, they would differentially adjust
their product hierarchy across countries and ∆avg rankfd would be unrelated to ∆Nproductsfd.
Through the lens of our conceptual framework, the combined evidence in Tables 9 and 10 there-
fore indicates that firm-product level characteristics (production efficiency, product quality) are
powerful enough to generate stable product hieararchies within multi-product firms, both in the
cross-section of countries and in the time-series within countries.
6 Conclusion
This paper establishes that product hierarchies and quality differentiation govern the operations
of multi-product firms. We present a general conceptual framework in which manufacturers draw
different production efficiencies across products and optimally choose the distribution of prices,
quality, and sales across their product range. This framework delivers a set of predictions that
allow us to empirically assess how efficiency and quality sorting interact with the product margin
inside firms.
Using detailed customs data for China, we empirically establish that firms allocate activity
across products in line with strong quality differentiation. Multi-product firms vary output
quality across their products by using inputs of different quality levels. Their core competence is
in varieties of superior quality that command higher prices but nevertheless generate higher sales.
In markets where they offer fewer products, firms concentrate activity in these core varieties by
dropping low-quality peripheral goods on the extensive margin and by shifting sales towards
top-quality products on the intensive margin. Finally, firms’ export dynamics follow systematic
reallocations of activity across the product quality ladder, both in general and in response to
exogenous trade reforms such as the removal of MFA quotas on textiles and apparel.
Our results inform the determinants of firms’ export success and the design of export-
promoting policies in developing economies. They also have implications for the measurement
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of multi-product firms’ productivity and performance in environments with efficiency, quality,
and mark-up variation across firms and products. More broadly, we shed light on the impact
of trade reforms and other economic shocks such as exchange rate fluctuations at the firm and
aggregate levels, as well as on the adjustment process mediating this impact. An important
avenue for future research is understanding how quality differentiation across firms and across
products within firms affects the welfare and distributional consequences of international trade.
Two key considerations in this context are the production complementarities between input qual-
ity, worker skill, and managerial capacity, and frictions in the allocation of resources across firms
and across product lines within firms.
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# Obs Average St Dev Min
5th 
Percentile
95th 
Percentile
Max
Panel A. Variation across firms within products
1. firm-product-year prices          
(product-year FE)
6,185,641 0.00 1.32 -15.30 -2.01 2.16 14.07
2. firm-product-destination-year 
prices (product-year FE)
14,351,836 0.00 1.24 -16.59 -1.92 2.01 14.30
3. st dev of prices across firms 
within dest-product-year triplets 
(dest-product-year FE)
1,071,478 0.89 0.73 0.00 0.07 2.28 10.02
Panel B. Variation across products within firms
4. st dev of prices across 
products within firm-year pairs 
(firm-year FE, product-year FE)
547,534 0.84 0.63 0.00 0.12 2.05 9.29
5. st dev of prices across 
products within firm-dest-year 
triplets (firm-dest-year FE, 
product-year FE)
2,200,442 0.75 0.63 0.00 0.07 1.94 9.77
Product Rank by Sales 1 2 3 4 5 >5 Total
Product Rank by Price
1 5.47% 2.15% 1.18% 0.75% 0.51% 2.13% 12.19%
2 2.27% 2.30% 1.14% 0.69% 0.47% 1.99% 8.86%
3 1.23% 1.22% 1.26% 0.71% 0.46% 1.91% 6.79%
4 0.76% 0.74% 0.76% 0.81% 0.48% 1.88% 5.43%
5 0.51% 0.50% 0.51% 0.51% 0.55% 1.87% 4.45%
>5 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.96% 1.97% 52.51% 62.28%
Total 12.19% 8.86% 6.79% 5.43% 4.45% 62.28% 100.00%
Table 1. Variation in Export Prices across Firms, Products and Destinations
This table summarizes the variation in f.o.b. export prices across firms, products, and destinations in the 2002-2006 panel. Line 1 (Line 2):
summary statistics for firm-product-year (firm-product-destination-year) log prices, after taking out product-year pair fixed effects. Line 3: for
each destination-product-year market with multiple Chinese exporters, we record the standard deviation of log prices across firms, after
taking out destination-product-year triple fixed effects. Line 3 shows how this standard deviation varies across destination-product-year
triplets. Line 4 (Line 5): for each multi-product firm, we record the standard deviation of log prices across products by year (by destination-
year). Line 4 (Line 5) shows how this standard deviation varies across firm-year (firm-destination-year) observations. 
Table 2. Firms' Product Rank by Export Prices and Sales
This table ranks products within multi-product firms based on either worldwide export revenues (columns) or export price (rows), separately
for each year in the 2002-2006 panel. The product with the highest sales (price) in each firm-year is ranked first, the second highest receives
rank 2, etc. For each firm-product-year triplet, we construct the export price as the ratio of worldwide export revenues and quantities,
demeaned by its product-year average across firms. Each cell in the table shows what percent of all firm-product pairs receive a certain rank
by price and revenue, averaged across all years.
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Dependent variable: (log) export price by firm, product and year
Market Rauch R&D Adv + R&D Product
Power Dummy Intensity Intensity Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(log) Sales 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.055*** 1.006***
(61.07) (62.28) (19.75) (47.91) (44.61) (3.79) (385.57)
Market Share -0.415***
(-17.58)
(log) Sales x 0.019*** 0.270*** 0.065**  
Quality Differentiation (13.94) (9.94) (2.28)
Quality Differentiation -0.206*** -4.767***  0.336
(-15.93) (-18.95) (1.48)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.72 0.56
# observations 4,127,779 4,127,779 2,857,087 3,995,973 4,013,020 4,127,779 4,127,779
# firms 175,949 175,949 156,088 170,785 171,608 175,949 175,949
Dependent variable: (log) export price by firm, product, destination and year
Market Rauch R&D Adv + R&D Product
Power Dummy Intensity Intensity Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(log) Sales 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.065*** 0.898*** 
(41.24) (41.99) (19.95) (28.64) (27.68) (3.40) (219.13) 
Market Share -0.072***
(-6.94)
(log) Sales x 0.012*** 0.396*** 0.188*** 
Quality Differentiation (7.09) (11.45)  (5.12) 
Quality Differentiation -0.178***  -6.331*** -1.570***
(-12.35) (-20.21) (-5.47)   
Firm-Dest-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.72 0.61
# observations 9,481,443 9,481,443 6,533,138 9,247,765 9,290,452 9,481,443 9,481,443
# firm-dest pairs 175,949 175,949 156,088 170,785 171,608 175,949 175,949
This table examines the relationship between bilateral export prices and revenues across products within firm-destination-years. For each firm,
product, destination and year, the log price is demeaned by its product-destination-year average across firms. In Column 2 market power is proxied
by the firm's share of total Chinese exports by product-destination-year. Product scope for quality differentiation is measured as in Table 3. Column
6 uses products' rank by price and revenues across products within each firm-destination-year triplet instead of log price and log revenues. In
Column 7 log price is replaced by inferred log quality as in Table 3. All regressions include a constant term and firm-destination-year triple fixed
effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10%
level.
Baseline (log) Quality
Table 3. Worldwide Export Prices and Sales across Products within Firms
This table examines the relationship between worldwide export prices and revenues across products within firm-years. For each firm-product-year
triplet, the log export price is the log ratio of worldwide export revenues and quantities, demeaned by its product-year average across firms. In
Column 2 market power is proxied by the firm's share of total Chinese exports by product-year. Product scope for quality differentiation is proxied by
the Rauch dummy for differentiated goods (Column 3), sectors' R&D intensity (Column 4), or sectors' combined advertising and R&D intensity
(Column 5). Column 6 uses products' rank by price and revenues across products within each firm-year instead of log price and log revenues. In
Column 7 log price is replaced by a proxy for log quality constructed from data on export prices and quantities. All regressions include a constant
term and firm-year pair fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Baseline (log) Quality
Table 4. Bilateral Export Prices and Sales across Products within Firm-Destination Pairs
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Baseline Market Power Hom Goods Diff Goods Proc Imports HS3 Product (log) Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(log) Input Price  0.134*** 0.134*** 0.088*** 0.111***  0.176*** 0.191*** 0.120***
(30.66) (30.69) (7.25) (29.89) (20.88) (34.89) (27.35)
Input Market Share 0.275
(1.55)
Output Market Share -0.120***
(-4.60)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.53 0.41 0.45 0.58 0.40
# observations 1,031,424 1,031,424 60,165 621,297 534,580 393,820 1,031,424
# firms 68,925 68,925 12,748 53,240 40,508 68,925 68,925
# product categories 7,039 7,039 1,283 3,026 6,231 171 7,039
Baseline Market Power Hom Goods Diff Goods Proc Imports IO Sector (log) Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(log) Input Price 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.032** 0.110*** 0.142*** 0.161*** 0.109***
(17.86) (17.86) (2.04㸧 (14.00) (11.81) (25.35) (14.12)
Input Market Share -0.165
(-0.76)
Output Market Share 2.473
(1.26)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.58 0.43 0.38 0.50 0.39
# observations 2,403,309 2,403,309 153,737 1,519,333 1,487,247 818,560 2,403,309
# firms 99,694 99,694 27,540 83,356 61,035 99,694 99,694
# product categories 6,418 6,418 1,275 2,759 6,175 92 6,418
Panel B. Input price based on all imports and IO tables
Table 5. Export Prices and Imported-Input Prices across Products within Firms
This table examines the relationship between firms' export prices and imported-input prices across products within firm-years. The outcome
variable is firms' log export price by HS 8-digit product and year, except in Column 6 where it is the weighted average annual log export price
by HS 3-digit product or by IO sector using export revenues as weights. The input price is the weighted average of log import prices for inputs
matched to the output product, using import values as weights. It is based on imports in the same HS 3-digit product category (Panel A) or on
all inputs using input-output tables (Panel B). All prices have been demeaned by their product-year average across firms before any further
manipulation. In Column 2 market power in output markets is proxied by the firm's share of total Chinese exports by product category and
year; market power in input markets is proxied by the firm's average share of total Chinese imports across all inputs matched to the output
product, by year. Column 3 (4) restricts the sample to homogeneous (differentiated) export products. In Column 5 only processing imports
enter the calculation. In Column 7 the export and imported-input log prices are replaced by inferred export-product and imported-input log
quality as in Table 3. All regressions include a constant term and firm-year pair fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on
standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Dependent variable: (log) export price by firm, product category and year
Panel A. Input price based on imports in same HS-3 product category
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Baseline Market Power Hom Goods Diff Goods Weighted Avg Baseline Weighted Avg
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(log) # Products 1.714*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 0.001 -0.024*** -0.002 -0.035*** 0.899*** 
(333.42) (-15.53)  (-15.69) (0.28) (-15.90) (-1.35) (-5.65) (124.08)
Market Share -0.011**
(-2.48)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.56
# observations 3,236,020 3,236,020 3,236,020 388,613 2,272,354 3,236,020 3,236,020 3,236,020
# firms 175,949 175,949 175,949 50,659 142,559 175,949 175,949 175,949
Table 6. Product Scope, Exports and Average Price across Destinations within Firms
This table examines the relationship between bilateral export revenues, average export price, average quality, and product scope across destinations within
firm-years. Product scope is measured by the log number of products a firm exports to a given destination, by year. For each firm, product, destination and
year, we first demean the log price by its product-destination-year average across firms. We then construct the average log export price at the firm-destination-
year level as the arithmetic average of these demeaned prices (Columns 2-5) or their weighted average using the firms' export revenues in that destination
and year as weights (Column 6). In Column 3 market power is proxied by the firm's average share of total Chinese exports across all its products by
destination-year. Column 4 (5) restricts the sample to homogeneous (differentiated) goods. In Columns 7-8 log price is replaced by inferred log quality as in
Table 3. All regressions include a constant term and firm-year pair fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by firm.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Dep Variable (log) Sales
Avg (log) Price Avg (log) Quality
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Dep Variable 10
th
 Perc 90
th
 Perc
All Hom Goods Diff Goods All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Products 0.450*** 0.351*** 0.440*** -0.018*** 0.851***
(39.67) (14.70) (39.39) (-2.45) (34.81) 
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.72 0.67 0.70 0.30 0.83
# observations 3,236,020 388,613 2,272,355 1,445,003 1,445,003
# firms 175,949 50,659 142,559 130,631 130,631
Dep Variable 10
th
 Perc 90
th
 Perc
All Hom Goods Diff Goods All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Products 0.030** -0.000 0.036*** -0.319*** 0.367***
(2.11) (-0.05) (3.38) (-19.80) (30.48)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.91 0.86 0.90 0.69 0.96
# observations 3,236,020 388,613 2,272,355 1,445,003 1,445,003
# firms 175,949 50,659 142,559 130,631 130,631
Dep Variable 10
th
 Perc 90
th
 Perc
All Hom Goods Diff Goods All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Products 0.235*** 0.013*** 0.227*** -0.147*** 0.585***
(15.24) (6.11) (17.74) (-13.32) (30.66)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.85 0.77 0.84 0.57 0.91
# observations 3,236,020 388,613 2,272,355 1,445,003 1,445,003
# firms 175,949 50,659 142,559 130,631 130,631
Panel C. Products ranked by global quality
Average Rank
Table 7. Export Product Scope and Product Rank across Destinations within Firms
This table shows that firms focus on their core, expensive, high-quality products in markets where they export fewer
products. Product scope is measured by the log number of products a firm exports to a given destination, by year. For
each firm-year, we rank products globally based on the firm's worldwide export revenues (Panel A), worldwide export
prices (demeaned by their product-year average across firms) (Panel B), or inferred worldwide quality as in Table 3
(Panel C). The top product receives rank 1 and the bottom product - a rank equal to the number of products the firm
exports. Using these global product rankings, we record the average, 10
th
percentile and 90
th
percentile rank observed
across the products a firm exports to a given destination-year. Column 2 (3) restricts the sample to homogeneous
(differentiated) goods. Columns 4-5 restrict the sample to firm-destination-years with 2 or more products. All regressions
include a constant term and firm-year pair fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel B. Products ranked by global price
Average Rank
Panel A. Products ranked by global sales
Average Rank
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Panel A. Full panel, 2002-2006
Dep Variable
Product Rank By
Bilateral 
Sales
Bilateral 
Price
Bilateral 
Quality
Global Sales
Global
Price
Global 
Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 !"#$%&!+!,-$./01* 1.234*** -0.551*** -0.175*** -0.455***
(121.85) (-29.65) (-4.30) (-11.44)  
 !+!,-$./01* 0.532*** 0.028 0.346***
(15.48) (0.94) (9.17)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.47 0.49 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.72 0.55
# observations 170,083 68,538 68,538 68,538 170,083 170,083 170,083
# firms 39,701 24,206 24,206 24,206 39,701 39,701 39,701
Panel B. MFA reform, 2004-2006
Dep Variable
Product Rank By
Bilateral 
Sales
Bilateral 
Price
Bilateral 
Quality
Global Sales
Global
Price
Global 
Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 !"#$%&!+!,-$./01* 1.183*** -0.503*** -0.231* -0.470***
(40.31) (-10.39) (-1.87) (-4.69) 
 !+!,-$./01* 0.762*** 0.165 0.550***
(9.93) (1.03) (5.63)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.61 0.59 0.48 0.49 0.39 0.69 0.48
# observations 20,569 8,988 8,988 8,988 20,569 20,569 20,569
# firms 7,474 4,034 4,034 4,034 7,474 7,474 7,474
  (log) Sales
 !2$30)31-(14$3!5(14$   Average Rank
Table 10. Export Dynamics across Destinations within Firms
This table examines how firms adjust activity across destinations over time. Panel A considers adjustments within surviving firms from
2002 to 2006. Panel B considers adjustments within surviving firms in the textiles and apparel industries from 2004 to 2006 in response
to the removal of MFA quotas in 2005. In Column 1 the outcome variable is the change in bilateral log export revenues from t=0 to t=1. In
Columns 2-4 the outcome variable is the change in the log ratio of the sales of a firm's top-ranked product to the sales of its second-
ranked product, where product rank is based on firms' bilateral export revenues, price and quality as in Table 8. In Columns 5-7 the
outcome variable is the change in the average global product rank across the products a firm exports to a given destination, where
product rank is based on firms' worldwide export revenues, price and quality as in Table 7. All regressions include a constant term and
firm fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
  (log) Sales
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Dep Variable
Firm Attribute
Avg Export 
Price
Avg Export 
Quality
Avg Import 
Input Price
Avg Import 
Input Quality
St Dev Export 
Price
St Dev Export 
Quality
St Dev Import 
Input Price
St Dev Import 
Input Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Attribute2002 0.055*** 0.099*** 0.078*** 0.054*** 0.105*** 0.072*** 0.346*** 0.081***
(5.88) (43.86) (7.74) (23.67) (6.59) (19.53) (9.45) (9.87)
R-squared 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
# observations 67,416 67,416 43,180 43,180 48,466 48,466 22,731 22,731
Dep Variable
Firm Attribute
Avg Export 
Price
Avg Export 
Quality
Avg Import 
Input Price
Avg Import 
Input Quality
St Dev Export 
Price
St Dev Export 
Quality
St Dev Import 
Input Price
St Dev Import 
Input Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Attribute2002 0.046*** 0.002 0.168*** 0.041*** 0.108*** 0.019*** 0.108*** 0.019***
(4.99) (1.02) (16.9) (17.98) (6.73) (5.09) (6.73) (5.09)
Log Exports2002 -0.376*** -0.377*** -0.349*** -0.357*** -0.288*** -0.290*** -0.288*** -0.290***
(-72.32) (-71.95) (-54.19) (-54.68) (-46.39) (-46.37) (-46.39) (-46.37)
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
# observations 42,521 42,521 29,549 29,549 32,548 32,548 32,548 32,548
Log Exports2006 - Log Exports2002
Appendix Table 1. Motivating Facts: Trade Activity, Production Attributes and Product Profile across Firms
This table examines the relationship between firms' trade activity, production attributes and product profile. In Panel A the sample comprises all exporters in
2002, and the outcome variable is firms' log worldwide exports in 2002. In Panel B the sample comprises all firms that exported in both 2002 and 2006, and the
outcome variable is the 2002-2006 change in firms' log worldwide exports. In Panels C and D the sample comprises all exporter-years with balance-sheet data
on firm production attributes, and the outcome variable is indicated in the column heading. For each firm, the average and standard deviation of log export
price, log export quality, log imported-input price, and log imported-input quality are taken over the firm's export products and imported inputs, after these have
been demeaned by their product-year average. Capital intensity is log fixed capital per worker. Skill intensity is the share of employees with a high-school
degree. R&D + Advert Intensity is the share of R&D and advertising expenditures in total sales. All regressions include a constant term and fixed effects for
firms' primary industry of activity, province and ownership type. Panel D also includes year fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A. Export sales, prices and quality across firms, 2002
Log Exports2002
Panel B. Export growth, prices and quality across firms, 2002-2006
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Dep Variable
Avg Export 
Price
Avg Export 
Quality
Avg Import 
Input Price
Avg Import 
Input Quality
St Dev Export 
Price
St Dev Export 
Quality
St Dev Import 
Input Price
St Dev Import 
Input Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Productivity 0.022*** 0.173*** 0.054*** 0.389*** 0.008** 0.071*** 0.007* 0.012
(Levinsohn-Petrin) (4.08) (7.25) (7.56) (12.19) (2.10) (4.00) (1.87) (0.75)
Log Employment 0.009* 0.176*** 0.087*** 0.589*** 0.027*** 0.207*** 0.028*** 0.130***
(1.93) (8.50) (14.12) (21.60) (8.70) (14.41) (8.72) (9.40)
Capital Intensity 0.017*** 0.144*** 0.126*** 0.624*** 0.011*** 0.070*** 0.017*** 0.047***
(3.67) (7.04) (20.41) (22.61) (3.69) (4.87) (5.61) (3.41)
Skill Intensity 0.249*** 0.724*** 0.275*** 1.118*** 0.107*** 0.494*** 0.056*** 0.210***
(12.30) (7.92) (9.84) (9.06) (7.81) (7.82) (4.12) (3.47)
Log Avg Wage 0.258*** 0.970*** 0.240*** 1.062*** 0.087*** 0.414*** 0.026*** 0.131***
(21.77) (18.25) (16.63) (16.68) (11.00) (11.17) (3.54) (4.10)
R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.16 0.15
# observations 44,086 44,086 28,009 28,009 34,158 34,158 16,673 16,673
Dep Variable
Avg Export 
Price
Avg Export 
Quality
Avg Import 
Input Price
Avg Import 
Input Quality
St Dev Export 
Price
St Dev Export 
Quality
St Dev Import 
Input Price
St Dev Import 
Input Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Productivity 0.013*** 0.133*** 0.009*** 0.096*** 0.057*** 0.425*** 0.010*** 0.022**
(Levinsohn-Petrin) (4.07) (9.22) (4.07) (9.12) (13.57) (22.60) (4.47) (2.28)
Log Employment 0.024*** 0.238*** 0.024*** 0.188*** 0.089*** 0.595*** 0.023*** 0.112***
(8.49) (19.07) (12.98 (21.88) (23.82) (35.87) (12.46) (13.73)
Capital Intensity 0.029*** 0.187*** 0.013*** 0.092*** 0.142*** 0.686*** 0.015*** 0.040***
(11.03) (15.67 (6.93) (10.69) (40.05) (43.43) (8.24) (4.94)
R&D + Advert 1.000*** 2.950*** 0.704*** 2.970*** 1.033*** 3.546*** 0.269*** 1.104***
Intensity (2.61) (2.97) (2.97) (3.44) (3.53) (3.73) (2.89) (3.03)
Log Avg Wage 0.244*** 0.900*** 0.093*** 0.429*** 0.264*** 1.169*** 0.035*** 0.150***
(35.5) (29.65) (21.01) (20.97) (31.85) (31.95) (8.30) (8.11)
R-squared 0.15 0.13 0.27 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.14 0.12
# observations 122,272 122,272 96,909 96,909 77,146 77,146 47,548 47,548
Panel C. Production attributes, prices and quality across firms, 2004
Panel D. Production attributes, prices and quality across firms, 2002, 2005, 2006
Appendix Table 1. Motivating Facts: Trade Activity, Production Attributes and Product Profile across Firms
This table examines the relationship between firms' trade activity, production attributes and product profile. In Panel A the sample comprises all exporters in
2002, and the outcome variable is firms' log worldwide exports in 2002. In Panel B the sample comprises all firms that exported in both 2002 and 2006, and the
outcome variable is the 2002-2006 change in firms' log worldwide exports. In Panels C and D the sample comprises all exporter-years with balance-sheet data
on firm production attributes, and the outcome variable is indicated in the column heading. For each firm, the average and standard deviation of log export
price, log export quality, log imported-input price, and log imported-input quality are taken over the firm's export products and imported inputs, after these have
been demeaned by their product-year average. Capital intensity is log fixed capital per worker. Skill intensity is the share of employees with a high-school
degree. R&D + Advert Intensity is the share of R&D and advertising expenditures in total sales. All regressions include a constant term and fixed effects for
firms' primary industry of activity, province and ownership type. Panel D also includes year fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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# Obs Average St Dev Min Max
Panel A. Unit of observation: firm-product-year
Log Exports 4,127,779 9.42 2.78 0.00 22.51
Log Price 4,127,779 0.00 1.32 -12.62 13.71
Log Quality 4,127,779 0.00 6.28 -56.18 58.21
Panel B. Unit of observation: firm-destination-product-year
Log Exports 9,508,299 9.17 2.50 0.00 21.99
Log Price 9,481,443 0.00 1.09 -12.90 13.68
Log Quality 9,481,443 0.00 5.08 -56.81 59.39
Dependent variable: (log) export price by firm, product, destination and year
Rauch R&D Adv + R&D
Dummy Intensity Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(log) Sales 0.083*** 0.038*** 0.079*** 0.068*** 1.332*** 
(70.38) (10.57) (54.58) (36.40) (282.50)
(log) Sales x 0.055*** 0.216*** 0.581***
Quality Differentiation (13.99) (3.43) (9.90)
Dest-Product-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.024 0.028 0.025 0.025 0.285
# observations 9,481,443 6,533,138 9,247,765 9,290,452 9,481,443
# dest-product pairs 1,156,681 737,451 1,109,223 1,118,503 1,156,681
This table examines the relationship between export prices and revenues across firms within a destination-
product-year market in the spirirt of Manova and Zhang (2012). Product scope for quality differentiation is
measured as in Table 3. All regressions include a constant term and destination-product-year triple fixed effects.
Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by destination-product. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Baseline
across Firms within Destination-Product Pairs
(log) Quality
Appendix Table 2. Summary Statistics
This table summarizes the variation in f.o.b. log export revenues, prices and inferred quality across firms,
products, and destinations in the 2002-2006 panel. The unit of observation is the firm-product-year triplet in Panel
A and the firm-product-destination-year quadruplet in Panel B. Log prices and log quality have been demeaned
by product-year pair fixed effects in Panel A and by destination-product-year triple fixed effects in Panel B.
Appendix Table 3. Export Prices and Sales
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